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Coastal zone regulation and policy in South Carolina had three distinct phases 
between 1972 and 1993.  Each was a result of choices based on state conditions and did 
not indicate an inherent route, as revealed through a comparison to North Carolina.  The 
strongest period of regulation was a response to worsening erosion and to changes in 
scientific knowledge.  While likely the best course of action for the coast when 
considered over time, this regulation was defeated by competing concerns, particularly 
private property rights, that emerged after Hurricane Hugo and litigation related to the 
regulation.  South Carolina’s foray into coastal zone management illustrates the difficulty 
of formulating and implementing effective environmental regulation and shows the 
complexity of factors that affect the success of a regulatory program.  The state’s coastal 
zone regulation program, which declined based on the disapproving response of many 
citizens and subsequently legislators, can be deemed unsuccessful.  While the legislature 
tried to protect the state’s economy by protecting the beaches, it did not take into account 
the economic consequences to individuals.  The malfunction of the regulatory process in 
this setting indicates that people support regulation, or are at least ambivalent about it, 
until they are directly affected by it in a way that they perceive as negative.  Regulation 
for private citizens, as opposed to corporations, must take into account that individuals 
have not been exposed to the regulatory process and are not accustomed to regulation 
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“The edge of the sea is a strange and beautiful place.  All through the long history 
of Earth it has been an area of unrest where waves have broken heavily against 
the land, where the tides have pressed forward over the continents, receded, and 
then returned.  For no two successive days is the shore line precisely the same.” 
--Rachel Carson 
The Edge of the Sea 
 
Land located near the ocean is some of the most valuable property within the 
United States.  However, development within these areas can be harmful in numerous 
ways and for several reasons.  First, the coast is subject to unique and dynamic natural 
processes that can endanger both development and human life.  Unwise siting and 
development decisions can exacerbate these processes.  Imprudent and ill-advised 
development and positioning of homes and businesses may also impede or otherwise 
harm less aggressive natural processes (such as tides) that can damage ecosystems and 
valuable natural resources.  The coastal zone is highly sought after for its scenic value 
and recreational values, yet it is small in area compared to the number of people who 
seek to make use of it.  It can be made even smaller by private property owners who seek 
exclusivity of its use.  In South Carolina, coastal real estate is expensive and highly 
desired.  It provides a large portion of South Carolina’s economy and is home to a 
considerable amount of its population.  The regulation of land near the ocean in South 
Carolina is highly contentious and has gone through several periods of change beginning 
in the 1970s.      
 
 2
The South Carolina Coast Before 1970 
Historically, development along the South Carolina coast was governed by the 
risk associated with construction.  Only people who could afford to shoulder the risk 
themselves built along the coast.  Most of the structures built in the coastal zone, 
particularly on the barrier islands of the Atlantic Ocean, were owned by the rich.  By the 
end of the eighteenth century, South Carolina planters were erecting summer beach 
cottages, and Pawley’s Island (located just off the coast between Murrell’s Inlet and Mt. 
Pleasant) was particularly popular.  Wealthy planters sought relief from the hot and 
humid summer climate at these new retreats.  Near Charleston, well-to-do residents began 
to build cottages on Sullivan’s Island in the early 1800s.  By 1824, the island had a 
summer population of approximately one thousand.1   
Until the mid-twentieth century, coastal building was almost exclusively an 
activity of the wealthy because of the risks associated with it.  Prior to the passage of the 
National Flood Insurance Program of 1968, few insurance companies would insure 
oceanfront buildings, and few banks would grant mortgages for oceanfront buildings, at 
least without other collateral.  As a result, most construction in the coastal zone was done 
by the well-to-do, reflecting an awareness of the risks and costs of building there.  When 
federal insurance became available for these structures, they began multiplying, as 
individuals were no longer required to incur all the risks of shoreline ownership 
                                                 
1 James B. London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion Management Issues and Options in South 
Carolina (Charleston: South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium, 1981), 39. 
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themselves.2  This legislation encouraged those who may not have been wealthy enough 
to self-insure to build homes near the ocean.    
During the 1960s and 1970s, coastal development increased tremendously in 
South Carolina, particularly in Horry County.  Horry County is the northern-most coastal 
county in South Carolina and is also the largest county in the state.  Myrtle Beach, a 
sizeable tourist area, is located in Horry County.  There were no restrictions or 
regulations in place during this period of large-scale growth on where one could develop, 
including the beaches or dunes.  South Carolina did not regulate oceanfront building 
before 1977, and since natural erosion at that point only averaged about one foot per year, 
there appeared to be few erosion-related problems associated with development, even 
fairly close to the shore.3 
Over time, population growth and its accompanying development increased and 
put immense pressure on the resources and ecosystems of the coast.4  Coastal 
development harmed the habitats of fish and coastal wildlife.  Construction in the coastal 
zone also altered natural processes and their resulting impacts.5  Housing developments 
and other building required new and larger infrastructures (such as roads, utilities and 
                                                 
2 G.S. Kleppel and others, “Trends in Land Use Policy and Development in the Coastal Southeast,” in 
Changing Land Use Patterns in the Coastal Zone: Managing Environmental Quality in Rapidly Developing 
Regions, ed. G.S. Kleppel, M. Richard DeVoe and Mac V. Dawson (New York: Springer, 2006), 28.  The 
National Flood Insurance Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. 4001 et seq. 
3 Timothy W. Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina (Charleston: South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium, 
1988), 28. 
4 “The most important factor in the decline of environmental conditions within the coastal zone has been 
the unprecedented increase in human population growth, particularly in the southeastern United States.”  
Geoffrey I. Scott, A. Frederick Holland, and Paul A. Sandifer, “Afterword: Managing Coastal Urbanization 
and Development in the Twenty-First Century: The Need for a New Paradigm,” Changing Land Use 
Patterns in the Coastal Zone: Managing Environmental Quality in Rapidly Developing Regions, ed. G.S. 
Kleppel, M. Richard DeVoe and Mac V. Dawson (New York: Springer, 2006), 285-299, 285.  
5 Orrin H. Pilkey and others, The North Carolina Shore and Its Barrier Islands: Restless Ribbons of Sand 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 37. 
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schools), the construction or improvement of which further harmed the sensitive 
ecosystems and processes.  For these reasons, population growth near the coast has 
become a concern. 
The numbers associated with this growth are informative.  The total population of 
the coastal counties of the southeastern region of the United States rose by sixty-four 
percent between 1970 and 1990.6  During the latter decade, the greatest population 
increases on the east coast took place in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia and Florida.7  The Census Bureau has predicted that approximately eleven 
million people will move to the North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia between 
1995 and 2025, and between fifty and seventy-five percent of them will reside on the 
coastal plains of this three state region.8  Between 1990 and 2000, the population of 
South Carolina’s coastal counties increased from 833,519 to 981,338, a 17.73 percent 
increase.9  There has been change over time in terms of the population of the coastal zone 
that increased dramatically in the mid-twentieth century.  Before the twentieth century, 
development near the coast was not seen as a problem, both because it was scarce and 
because there was little in terms of scientific knowledge to indicate that it might become 
a problem.  This twentieth-century development exacerbated natural conditions and 
resulted in problems such as erosion.   
                                                 
6 M. Richard DeVoe and G.S. Kleppel, “Introduction—The Effects of Changing Land Use Patterns on 
Marine Resources: Setting a Research Agenda to Facilitate Management,” Changing Land Use Patterns in 
the Coastal Zone: Managing Environmental Quality in Rapidly Developing Regions, ed. G.S. Kleppel, M. 
Richard DeVoe and Mac V. Dawson (New York: Springer, 2006), 1-19, 3. 
7 F. John Vernberg and Winona Vernberg, The Coastal Zone: Past, Present, and Future (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 62. 
8 Kleppel and others, “Trends in Land Use Policy,”23-45, 26. 
9Timothy Beatley, David J. Brower and Anna K. Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 
2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002), 56. 
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In addition to the dramatic increase in population, day and overnight visitors to 
the coastal zone increased in the mid to late twentieth century, particularly in South 
Carolina.  The total of the permanent population and the visitor population is referred to 
as the “peak population.”  In the coming years, the peak population of east coast coastal 
zone areas is expected to increase even more.10  During this period of growth, visitors to 
the coastal zone, particularly in the greater Myrtle Beach area, often sought 
accommodations and attractions on or near the shoreline, one of the most ecologically 
sensitive and easily damaged areas of the coastal zone.  As a result, hotel construction 
near the beach grew dramatically. 
South Carolina’s coastal zone is significant.  It measures approximately 8,116 
square miles, including about 500,000 acres of coastal marshes (335,000 of which are 
classified as salt marsh), 35,000 acres of brackish water, 65,000 acres of freshwater 
marsh, 40 barrier islands and 3 million acres of forested lands. The coastal zone 
comprises about 23% of state’s land area. In the 1970s, it contained 21% of state’s 
population, 18% of the state’s labor force and 16% of the state’s unemployment. The 
most important economic sectors as of 1970 in South Carolina’s coastal zone were 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, recreation and tourism, government and limited industry.11 
The South Carolina coastal zone consists of eight counties and includes both their 
lands and waters:  Beaufort, Berkeley, Charleston, Colleton, Dorchester, Georgetown, 
Horry and Jasper.  Additionally, the South Carolina Coastal Management Act specified 
                                                 
10 Vernberg and Vernberg, The Coastal Zone, 65. 
11 Office of Coastal Zone Management, National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration and South 
Carolina Coastal Council, Final Environmental Impact Statement of the Proposed Coastal Management 
Program for the State of South Carolina (Washington: US Dept. of Commerce, 1979), pt. 3, 1-4. 
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that the coastal zone was to include the coastal waters and submerged lands seaward to 
the State’s jurisdictional limits.12 South Carolina’s coastline is complex and irregular, 
broken up by numerous tidal inlets, with beaches facing more than one direction.  (This is 













The lighter shading indicates the coastal zone.  The darker shading indicates the areas of the coastal zone 
that have been designated critical areas under the Beachfront Management Act, an amended form of the 
South Carolina Coastal Management Act. 
 
Generally, South Carolina beaches are wider than the beaches of the other 
Atlantic coast states.15  Another general trend in South Carolina is sand movement.  Most 
                                                 
12 South Carolina Coastal Council, Legal Analysis and Goals and Objectives of the South Carolina Coastal 
Management Program, Draft Report no. 2 (South Carolina Coastal Council: February, 1978), 13. 
13 Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 13.  The opposite of erosion is accretion.  This is the process of 
increasing the surface area of a beach through the natural transfer of sand from another area.  Interestingly, 
the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act, originally and as amended, provides that accreted land 
automatically becomes the property of the State:  “…no person or governmental agency may develop ocean 
front property accreted by natural forces or as the result of permitted or non-permitted structures beyond 
the mean high water mark as it existed at the time the ocean front property was initially developed or 
subdivided, and such property shall remain the property of the State held in trust for the people of the 
State.”13  From a practical standpoint, this would obviously be a difficult provision to enforce, at least until 
the accretion became substantial.       
14 Figure One is taken from the website for the Department of Health and Environmental Control, 
http://www.scdhec.net/environment/ocrm/ (accessed on August 9, 2007). 
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of South Carolina’s inlets seem to depend on a persistent source of sand from beaches to 
the north to feed the inlet system, indicating a trend that sand shifts southward because of 
wind and waves.  The shape of South Carolina’s barrier islands offers evidence of this 
trend:  the northern ends of the islands are commonly wider than the southern ends.  This 
means that some beaches are more secure or “healthy” than others because of where they 
are positioned in relation to their supply of incoming sand.16  On the other side of the 
coin, however, are the beaches from which the sand is moving.  These beaches are 
experiencing erosion at a higher rate.17  Of the thirty states in the United States with a 
coastline, all experience localized erosion.18  Some figures put the total of open shoreline 
that is retreating in a landward direction in the continental United States at between 
eighty and ninety percent.19  In sum, South Carolina’s coast is a multifaceted, convoluted 
group of parts, each experiencing its own responses to natural and human-made stimuli.  
Some parts appear to be healthy as to the problems associated with erosion, while others 
seem to be melting away more quickly.  The factor that can make all the degrees of 
erosion appear relevant is coastal development. 
Coastal regions are affected by, and in point of fact are constantly being altered 
by, both natural and human impacts.  Changes in the shoreline are natural and would 
occur if humans were not present.  The coast is transient, and its ordinary conduct and 
natural cycles include both erosion and accretion.  Without human activity and 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 19. 
16 Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 19-21. 
17 Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 22. 
18 Beatley, Brower and Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 43. 
19 Pilkey and others, The North Carolina Shore, 87. 
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development in the coastal zone, these activities would occur without concern.20  Human 
activities in the coastal zone have had, and continue to have, dramatic effects on the 
coastal zone, particularly on the rate of shoreline erosion.  Despite some of the recent 
efforts of society, these activities have been primarily negative and have almost always 
increased the rate of shoreline erosion.  Table One lists many of both the natural and 




Factors Affecting Shoreline Erosion 
Natural Factors Man-Made Factors 
Breaking Waves Dams on Rivers 
Winds Shorefront Development 
Currents Seawalls 
Rain Groins and breakwaters 
Sediment supply Harbor jetties 
Tidal cycle Offshore dredging 
Storm frequency Beach sand mining 
Sea-level rise Boat wakes 
Near shore bathymetry Farm practices 
Regional geology Surface water runoff 
Biogenic process (reef building, burrowing 
by organisms, etc.) 
 
 
While most of these factors are in play in nearly all coastal communities, some 
are more influential than others in South Carolina.  Of the natural processes, breaking 
waves and storm frequency are prevalent in the Palmetto State.  Of the human-caused 
factors, shorefront development, particularly in Horry County and on the barrier islands, 
                                                 
20 Peter W. French, Coastal Defences: Process, Problems and Solutions (London: Routledge, 2001), 19-20. 
21 Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 10. When considered in the whole of geologic time, South 
Carolina’s coast has been building, not eroding, through the sediment buildup resulting from the erosion of 
the Appalachian Mountains. As a result, much of the state’s coast is quite young from the standpoint of 
geologic time.  The barrier islands, for example, are only about four thousand years old. 
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and erosion-control devices, particularly seawalls and groins, have been the cause of a 
large extent of the erosion along the South Carolina coast. 
Erosion can be classified depending on how immediate the danger is to the 
coastline and to the accompanying structures.  (Erosion is the landward dislocation of the 
shoreline.  When beach erodes, sand located there is moved into the ocean and away from 
the shoreline.)22  An area likely to suffer from imminent erosion is subject to an erosion 
hazard within ten years.  What this means is that within a decade the beach in front of the 
area could be gone due to erosion.  In terms of buildings, land underneath the structure 
could be damaged by erosion within ten years or even that the water could touch the 
structure within ten years.  The worst case scenario in this category is that the beach and 
the land under the structure’s foundation could completely erode within a decade, leaving 
the structure to fall into the water.  The next most dangerous category is intermediate.  An 
area subject to an intermediate hazard may be subject to erosion hazards within thirty 
years.  Finally, an area subject to long-term erosion hazards will likely be safe from 
erosion for sixty years or more.23  The least wise decision would be to improve land 
within an imminent erosion hazard zone.  Development within the intermediate hazard 
zone is likely acceptable, though smaller, moveable structures would be preferable.  
Development within the long-term erosion hazard zone would be preferable, both for the 
health of the shoreline and coastal zone as well as for the monetary stake of the 
landowner or developer.  Most people do not consider erosion a serious natural hazard, as 
                                                 
22 Beatley, Brower and Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 43. Erosion is much more 
common than accretion, which is the increase of coastal land based on the deposit of sand or other 
sediment. 
23 National Research Council, Managing Coastal Erosion (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 
1990), 7. 
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it poses no direct threat to human life and is only noticeable over time.24  Nevertheless, it 
can be responsible for partial or complete loss in terms of property value and is therefore 
a contentious legal issue that emerges repeatedly in coastal zone management.   
There are three basic responses to erosion along the coast when development is 
already present: do nothing, renourish the beaches (by moving sand from another location 
to the beach to build it up) or “armor” the beaches via erosion-control devices.  While 
beach renourishment is preferable to erosion-control devices, it is not a perfect solution.  
Renourishment is preferable in that it allows maintenance of natural coastal processes 
while still providing increased levels of coastal protection.  For this reason, it is 
sometimes called “an imitation of nature.”25  It can also be discontinued if determined to 
be ineffective, without the problems of deteriorating structures or structure removal that 
would be associated with hard defenses.26  However, renourishment must be repeated, 
sometimes indefinitely, to be effective, since the beach is not being allowed to function 
naturally.  This can be extremely costly.  In addition to the expense of repeating the 
process indefinitely, there is a need for a source site for the harvest of renourishment 
materials.  The borrow site must have sand that is similar to the renourishment location 
for the process to be most effective.  Borrow sites can become environmentally unstable 
themselves if over-harvested for renourishment materials.27  Nevertheless, because of the 
                                                 
24 Owen J. Furuseth and Sallie M. Ives, “Individual Attitudes Toward Coastal Erosion Policies: Carolina 
Beach, North Carolina,” in Cities on the Beach: Management Issues of Developed Coastal Barriers, ed. 
Rutherford H. Platt, Sheila G. Pelczarski and Barbara K.R. Burbank (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Department of Geography, 1987), 185-196, 185. 
25 London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 27. 
26 London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 29. 
27 London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 28. 
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value of property in many coastal areas, some renourishment is often viewed as 
absolutely necessary.28 
In addition to renourishment, other options exist for defense.  Coastal defense 
mechanisms are generally classified as either soft (such as beach renourishment) or hard 
(erosion control devices or structures).  Hard defenses include any structure that provides 
a solid barrier between the land and the ocean so as to resist the energy of the waves.  
This classification of defense would include seawalls, bulkheads, revetments, groins and 
jetties.  Seawalls are large structures designed to provide a permanent separation between 
land and water; seawalls are used to protect against direct wave action.  Bulkheads are 
used primarily to protect fill located landward of their location and to provide protection 
from small waves.  Revetments are lighter structures used to armor the dune slope; they 
are often made of a more flexible material such as rubble.  Groins are long narrow 
structures that run perpendicular to the shoreline and into the water and are designed to 
trap moving sand.  Jetties extend into the water as groins do, but they are used to control 
inlet areas, as opposed to beach areas.29  The selection of an erosion-control device is 
dependent upon the dynamics of the area.  These devices may also be used in 
combination with one another or in combination with beach renourishment.30  These 
structures prevent natural coastal processes from operating and result in a series of 
impacts on the natural environment.31  Erosion-control devices have been a controversial 
issue because of their effects.  While some types protect the subject structures that have 
                                                 
28 French, Coastal Defences, 213-14. 
29 London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 29-34. 
30 London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 35-6. 
31 French, Coastal Defences, 47. 
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been created to shield, they may also result in continued shoreline retreat and beach 
loss.32   
Erosion-control devices have been employed both by private landowners and by 
state governments in attempts to stop landward movement of the shoreline.  In South 
Carolina, most of these structures were put into place by private property owners or 
groups of private property owners (such as homeowners associations).  Many were 
erected in the 1970s or before.  Coastal geologist Peter French has noted that hard 
defense historically remained a response to erosion control in many situations for several 
reasons.  First, hard defenses were traditional in many areas.  People often felt more 
secure behind a seawall than behind a built up beach, even if the degree of protection 
offered was similar.  The value of the land in question was often high, leading people to 
prefer a proactive method of defense.33  It is important to note, however, that erosion 
control devices were and are designed to protect property and not beaches.  Beaches, 
even if moving landward, would always be present if left alone.  These devices are not 
beach-saving techniques, but rather beach-diminishing devices.  Their sole goal is to 
preserve private property that lies landward of the beach.34   
Another circumstance which contributes to coastal defense is the existence and 
condition of sand dunes. Dunes can be thought of as natural sea walls, serving as a barrier 
between ocean and land.  South Carolina’s shoreline is fairly well-armed with dunes, 
                                                 
32 As coastal zone management specialist Timothy Beatley has indicated, there was a growing recognition 
in the early 1990s that attempts to fortify the coastline are largely futile, as well as being damaging to the 
environment. Timothy Beatley, “Hurricane Hugo and Shoreline Retreat: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the 
South Carolina Beachfront Management Act” (working paper, University of Virginia, September 1992), 1. 
33 Ibid.,  
34 Cornelia Dean, Against the Tide: The Battle for America’s Beaches (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1999), 16. 
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which average roughly four feet in height in developed areas and are usually covered, at 
least partially, with sea oats or other vegetation.  While highly fragile, dunes play a 
significant role in the stability of both the beaches that front them and the land behind 
them.  Like the shoreline, dunes are dynamic landforms.  They are able to supply sand to 
the beach when it is needed and store it when it is not needed.35  Dunes are essential to 
both the natural processes at work in the shoreline area, as well as serving as a line of 
defense for any structures that may lie landward of the dune.  When dunes and dune 
vegetation are altered by human activities, their protective value can be lessened or lost.  
A dune can be harmed if a structure is placed directly upon it, but it can also be damaged 
if a structure is built nearby, as beachfront development generally leads to the destruction 
of dune vegetation and the slow movement of dune sand via human activities near or one 
the dunes.  Dunes are easily destabilized.  There are several means of dune stabilization, 
including employing sand fences, planting vegetation (such as sea oats), and posting 
signs requesting that visitors stay off of dunes and/or that visitors do not remove or 
damage vegetation.36  Unlike erosion-control devices, however, dunes harm neither their 
adjacent beaches nor beaches downdrift. 
In the 1970s, coastal zone management became more fully developed as a 
science, and more research was done on the effects of hard defenses.  By the early 1980s, 
most experts agreed that the move away from erosion-control devices was the well-
informed and correct decision.  The general reasoning for this decision was that while 
they can protect structures near the shoreline from waves if they are properly designed 
                                                 
35 French, Coastal Defences, 218-19. 
36 Vernberg and Vernberg, The Coastal Zone, 116-118. 
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and constructed, seawalls almost always result in the eventual loss of the recreational 
beach.  Seawalls can degrade beaches in three ways: passive loss (waves crash against the 
wall and the offshore slope is steepened), placement loss (the seawall is built seaward of 
the high tide line, removing all or part of the beach when the wall is constructed) and 
active loss (the rate of beach loss is enhanced through the interaction of the wall and 
storms).37  Most of the time, the problems caused by these structures are reflected in the 
downdrift beaches, which experience more severe erosion than they would have 
otherwise.  These adjacent beaches often bear the brunt of the reduction of the natural 
processes.38     
The specific regulatory provisions considered for the coastal zone depended upon 
the unique attributes that the subject section possesses.  Each Atlantic coast state has a 
distinctive coastal zone that requires understanding for a proper recommendation and 
enactment of coastal zone management policy.  The marine environment generally is 
composed of three zones: coastal zone, continental shelf and open ocean.39  South 
Carolina’s shoreline and coastal zone are markedly different from those of its northern 
coastal neighbor, North Carolina, and its southern coastal neighbor, Georgia.  The state of 
South Carolina has 198 miles of ocean coastline.  This stretch is frequently divided into 
three zones:  1) Grand Strand—from Little River Inlet to Winyah Bay, 2) Santee Delta 
and 3) approximately 100 miles of barrier and sea islands.40    
                                                 
37 Pilkey and others, The North Carolina Shore, 91. 
38 National Research Council, Managing Coastal Erosion, 35. 
39 Scott, Holland and Sandifer, “Managing Coastal Urbanization and Development,” 285. 
40 Rutherford H. Platt and others, Coastal Erosion: Has Retreat Sounded?  Program on Environment and 
Behavior, Monograph No. 53 (Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado: 1992).  
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  Particular risk is affixed to development along the shoreline.  Structures 
developed close to the beach are in the path of storm-driven waves and are at the mercy 
of erosion.  Development on the coast is risky and tricky, yet it is thriving more than ever.  
In the mid-twentieth century, coastal landowners and developers began swiftly 
developing the coastal zone, and the pace has not slowed since.  Unquestionably, these 
human activities changed the natural processes at work in the coastal zone. 
Development in the coastal zone, as anywhere else, is governed by policies that 
manage and organize development.  As Dennis Ducsik of the Massachusetts Office of 
Coastal Zone Management has revealed, the federal and state governments have taken a 
direct role in protecting the intangible assets and qualities of the coastal zone since the 
1970s, as these types of values are not protected by market forces.41  As a result, the 
amount of development in each state impacted how regulation in that state looked and 
how successful it was.  If there was little development, there was less protest.  If there 
was more development, as was the case in South Carolina, there was more protest.    
As Timothy Kana, a coastal scientist and engineer, has observed, little attention is 
paid to the natural ebb and flow of beach shifts in undeveloped areas.42  (About forty 
percent, or over seventy miles, of South Carolina’s coastline is primitive and protected 
from future development due to its legal status as a park, wildlife refuge or other 
protected status.43  These areas are undeveloped.)  In areas where structures exist, 
however, even the smallest changes are observed and fretted over.  Coastal real estate is a 
                                                 
41 Dennis W. Ducsik, Shoreline for the Public: A Handbook of Social, Economic, and Legal Considerations 
Regarding Public Recreational Use of the Nation’s Coastal Shoreline (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), 209. 
42 Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 27. 
43 Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 32. 
 16
big, expensive business.  In many areas, coastal property doubles in value every five to 
ten years, so “losing” a piece of it to the ocean, even if it is small, is a major concern to 
land owners.  Even so, property owners can also “lose” land, or certain uses of it, through 
regulation.  This is what occurred in South Carolina through the regulation of the coast.  
Though the coastal property owners did not want their shoreline property to fall into the 
ocean, they also wanted to be free to build large houses there.     
 
The Coastal Zone Management Act and the Regulation of the South Carolina Coast 
Coastal zone management is the attempt to control and manage human activities 
so as to protect the natural resources of the coastal zone from humans and to likewise 
protect humans from the hazards presented by the coastal zone.44  It is a relatively new 
concept in terms of United States legal history that began with the federal Coastal Zone 
Management Act enacted in 1972.  This legislation was part of the flurry of federal 
environmental legislation enacted in the early 1970s during the Richard Nixon 
administration.  The Coastal Zone Management Act encouraged states to develop 
individualized coastal management programs and offered federal financial support if a 
handful of requirements were met.  Most Atlantic coast states responded to this offer of 
federal support and quickly developed their own legislation and the structures necessary 
to implement a coastal management program.  Table Two indicates that federal monies 
spent on state CZMA programs between 1972 and 2001.  It indicates that CZMA 
                                                 
44 Beatley, Brower and Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 13-14. 
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expenditures were significant during this period, when many states were in organization 





Selected Coastal Program Expenditures (by the federal government),  
Fiscal Years 1972-2001 
CZMA Section Expenditures (in millions of dollars) 
305—Program Development 72.1 
306—Program Administration 844.1 
308—Coastal Zone Management Fund 10.9 
309—Coastal Zone Enhancement 79.1 
310—Research and Technical Assistance 4.9 
 
South Carolina’s policy and legislation related to the coastal zone underwent 
several key changes.  The first, as aforementioned, was the passage of the state’s initial 
coastal zone management legislation.  This legislation came in direct response to passage 
of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, which was considered a necessary response 
to coastal degradation.  Before its initial legislation, South Carolina did not regulate 
oceanfront construction, yet there was little opposition to this law.  This statute was not 
protested by the public for three reasons.  First, the general climate of opinion during this 
era was favorable toward environmental statutes, so protection of the coast seemed like a 
good idea.  Second, this law did not really impact anyone except that some people were 
slightly inconvenienced by the permit process.  Otherwise, the property owners who 
already had houses or other structures in place were not affected, and development 
continued to increase.  Finally, it brought money into the state from the federal 
government.     
                                                 
45 Table One is adapted from Beatley, Brower and Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 
103. 
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The federal legislation was a reaction to the changing nature of society’s views as 
to hazards posed to the natural environment and calls for federal intervention to preserve 
and conserve the natural environment.  The public became increasingly aware of 
pollution and other dangers as a result of informative books, the development of ecology 
as a field, high-profile environmental disasters, and activities of environmental 
organizations that culminated in Earth Day in 1970.  The second major change to South 
Carolina’s coastal zone management policy occurred in response to a regarded failure of 
the initial legislation regarding erosion and to the subsequent report of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee.  After the state’s preliminary policy and legislation had been in place for a 
few years, it was evident that it had failed.  Erosion, particularly, was still a big problem.  
As a result, the Coastal Council (the state agency responsible for administering the state’s 
coastal zone management policy and legislation) appointed a special committee to 
determine what was wrong with the policy and legislation and how best to respond.  This 
committee released its report in 1987, citing the Coastal Council’s inadequate authority 
as one of the biggest issues that needed to be corrected.  The state’s legislation was then 
amended in 1988.  These amendments, known as the Beachfront Management Act 
(BMA), gave the Coastal Council new powers and strengthened the state’s law for 
protecting the coastal zone.  The BMA affected only a few property owners (those who 
had undeveloped lots) since most of the coast was already developed.  As a result, there 
was relatively little protest against the much stronger regulation.         
Problems began to surface, however, in 1989, when the Coastal Council began to 
enforce regulations regarding oceanfront development, particularly those that involved 
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setbacks and reconstruction near the shoreline.  These problems were exacerbated by 
natural forces, especially hurricanes, and by resistance to Coastal Council decisions by 
property owners.  Property owners spoke up, loudly and often, and they complained to 
their state legislators.  As a result, the legislators felt pressured to change the law to 
pacify their constituents.  The next major changes to South Carolina coastal zone 
management policy were directly precipitated by Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and by a battle 
in the courts, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.  Numerous houses were 
destroyed or severely damaged in Hugo, which brought the otherwise unconsidered 
setback provisions into play for several property owners.  These changes contrasted with 
passage of the initial legislation and to the changes made in response to the Blue Ribbon 
Committee’s Report in that they weakened the powers of the Coastal Council and 
backtracked in terms of conservation of the coastal zone.           
 
Literature Review 
The CZMA sought to provide the coastal states a basis for regulating the activities 
of human beings within the coastal zone.  The study of a subject of this type brings into 
play a number of disciplines.  The study of regulation generally encompasses history, 
political science and law.  (Business historian Thomas McCraw has correctly noted that 
in the case of economic regulation of business, a fourth discipline, economics, must be 
included as well.)46  The study of a federal regulation with environmental implications, 
such as the CZMA, may also encompass environmental science and/or ecology.  
                                                 
46 Thomas K. McCraw, “Regulation in America: A Review Article,” Business History Review 49, no. 2 
(Summer, 1975): 159-183, 159. 
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Consideration of coastal zone management legislation and its effectiveness requires the 
analysis of history and law, as well as the considerations of political science and ecology.   
Several historians and other academics have considered why the study and 
consideration of regulation may be relevant to legislators and others who influence 
policy.    Understanding how and why coastal zone management legislation and policy 
changed in South Carolina, particularly what factors influenced the changes and the 
difficulty of pacifying adverse groups within society, may have applicability to other 
contexts involving environmental regulation.  A study of these policy and legislative 
changes suggests that citizens can have an overpowering influence on how regulation is 
written and that their concerns regarding other rights can overcome scientific advice and 
recommendations.         
Environmental regulation may be placed into a larger context of regulation 
generally termed social regulation.  (Social regulation usually concerns non-market 
products of economic activity and is generally designed “‘to remedy the failure of the 
private market to price adequately the negative externalities of many productive 
practices…[which impose] economically unjustifiable costs on certain groups in the 
population.’”)47  Regulations covering workplace safety or consumer safety are usually 
identified as social regulation.48  Social regulation and reform have received considerable 
academic attention, much of it pre-dating the social reform explosion of the 1960s and 
1970s.  As early as 1911, Frank Goodnow, a prominent early twentieth century political 
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scientist, argued that the attitudes and opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court are the only 
Constitutional obstacles to social reform and that the Constitution itself offers few 
impediments to a substantial increase in government functions, both state and federal.49  
This proved to be one of the obstacles to progressive coastal zone management reform in 
South Carolina when Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council was decided. 
Other scholars have studied and emphasized the early roots of social regulation in 
the United States.  Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan, for example, illustrate that 
protective social regulation dates back to colonial times, when many colonies, including 
New York and Massachusetts, employed inspectors to protect the public from diseased or 
fraudulent provisions or other goods.50  Similarly, political scientist David Vogel notes 
that environmentally protective legislation was in place early in the twentieth century, 
citing a 1906 statute banning the import of sponges from the Gulf of Mexico that were 
harvested through methods that harmed these beds.51  Coastal zone management 
legislation was a later arrival, first appearing as a part of federal law in the early 1970s. 
Historians frequently divide the study of regulations into periods.  Public policy 
professor Marc Allen Eisner suggests that many varieties of regulation within a period 
are linked by larger policy objectives.  He believes that regulation generally has 
undergone several significant shifts, which he refers to as “regulatory regimes,” including 
a dramatic increase in social regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, a period which he refers 
to as the “societal” regime.  Eisner has argued that the study of regulation is valuable 
                                                 
49 Frank J. Goodnow, Social Reform and the Constitution (New York: Burt Franklin, 1911): 31, 231. 
50 Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan, Going By the Book: The Problem of Regulatory 
Unreasonableness (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), 8. 
51 David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), 8. 
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because it is helpful in recognizing the sources of contemporary policy debates.52  David 
Vogel contended that the United States has gone through three periods of change as to 
business-government relations in the twentieth century: Progressive Era, New Deal and 
the 1960s-1970s era.53  The Progressive/New Deal/1960s-1970s breakdown is the one 
most often used by historians of regulation.  Vogel notes that the most recent era is 
difficult to define as far as the boundary years, but he estimates that this era began about 
1964 and ended in approximately 1977.  Though he suggests that this era is more difficult 
to set chronological boundaries upon, he concludes that it is the most distinctive era of 
the three because it included greater political conflict over social regulation and because 
of the increase in federal social control in both number of regulations/agencies and 
degree of control.54  Political conflict was a condition suffered by coastal zone 
management policymakers in South Carolina, but it did not end in 1977.  It actually 
intensified as changes were made to the law.    
Public policy professor Cary Coglianese has asserted that laws and the reform of 
laws have a certain role in social movement as instruments to bring about social change.  
Law reform, therefore, is generally viewed a means of realizing the goal of social 
change.55  Specifically, he argues that the environmental movement began to transform 
law and society in the early 1970s.  Coglianese refers to “dramatic changes” to American 
                                                 
52 Marc Allen Eisner, Regulatory Politics in Transition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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54 Ibid. 
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law that he dates to the signing of the National Environmental Policy Act on January 1, 
1970.  The Coastal Zone Management Act, enacted two years later, was part of this series 
of changes.  It motivated otherwise conservative and regulation-averse states, including 
South Carolina, to police the use of their coastal zones.  Before the enactment of their 
coastal zone legislation in the late 1970s, there was no regulation of coastal zone use or 
near-ocean construction in South Carolina.  The only means of governance was common 
sense. 
Geologists Roger Charlier and Christian DeMeyer have argued that 
environmental management programs are usually introduced by a government agency 
reacting to resource degradation, exposure to major hazards, utilization conflict or the 
need for social-economic development.56  This supposition fits well with the concept of 
coastal zone management legislation, which is a response to two of these factors: 
resource degradation and utilization conflict.  As these authors note, the CZMA itself 
reflected a national concern “to harmonize the demands of urbanization, recreation, 
industry and energy development in the littoral fringe, and recognizes the incompatibility 
of these uses.”57   In terms of the regulation of natural resources, Arthur McEvoy has 
argued that it is the domain of public agencies to determine permissible levels of use or 
harvest so as to regulate effective and efficient use while conserving the resource for 
future use.58    
                                                 
56 Roger H. Charlier and Christian P. DeMeyer, Coastal Erosion: Response and Management (Berlin: 
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David Vogel has suggested that environmental regulation can be used to 
generalize about the politics and administration of regulation generally, though he 
acknowledges that environmental regulation in the United States is a politicized issue.59  
When South Carolina’s coastal zone management legislation was amended following 
Hurricane Hugo, it was a politicized issue based upon how the legislation would affect 
the property rights of coastal landowners.  Many of the legislators pushing for a weaker 
version of the law represented residents of the coastal counties.   
Another possibility is the use of environmental history as a form of advocacy.  
Environmental historian Richard Andrews argues that historical context actively affects 
environmental issues today.  He specifically offers the example of wetlands protection in 
the framework of years of federal policies and constitutional doctrines established over 
time, both of which have proven difficult to overcome.  Andrews contends that 
understanding the history of American environmental policy is necessary to correct what 
he views as existing problems.  He suggests that persistent public support is necessary to 
initiate and maintain government action and that both require knowledge of what has 
been successful and what has not.60  This was the key weakness of the South Carolina’s 
coastal zone management program.  When initially introduced, it had public support.  At 
that juncture, the weak regulations introduced replaced nothing and, in response, the state 
received federal money.  The amendments to the program seemed good in theory, based 
upon the idea that they would help decrease erosion.  This change represented the policy 
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60 Richard N.L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American 
Environmental Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 
 25
at its strongest point, both from a regulatory and a scientific standpoint.  The full 
regulatory implications of the amendments were not understood until after Hurricane 
Hugo and the Lucas challenge.  At that point, the regulations lost public support because 
they adversely affected another group of rights—property rights.  This group of rights 
was viewed by many of the citizens as more important than the environmental protection 
offered by the coastal zone management laws.  
Historians and political scientists have analyzed specific regulations and why they 
were deemed successes or failures.  Samuel P. Hays, a historian who has written 
extensively on environmental issues, maintains that analysis of this type can only be 
deemed successful if it includes the circumstances surrounding the regulation, the groups 
influenced by it and the ends which will be served through it.61  Similarly, Thomas 
McCraw argues that successful and effective regulation of business must take the 
economics of the situation into account.62  While McCraw applied this principle to the 
regulation of businesses, it applies to the regulation of individuals as well.  The laws 
passed by the states under the CZMA, unlike other environmental statutes like the Clean 
Air and Clean Water Acts, applied directly to individuals.  In the case of South Carolina, 
the legislature considered the economic objectives of the state as a whole when it devised 
the subject regulation, but it did not consider the economic consequences to affected 
individuals or the reactions that those people might have.  While corporations have had 
exposure to governmental regulation, individuals generally have not.  This inexperience 
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explains the failure of these property owners to educate themselves and give input in 
regard to the applicable regulation until Hurricane Hugo made it more conspicuous.      
Other scholars look for the roots or reasoning behind regulation.  A common line 
of reasoning contends that social regulation is required due to past actions or inaction.  
Environmental historian Richard Andrews believes that U.S. environmental policy is a 
“heterogeneous patchwork” that has been developed piecemeal through time, and that 
most of the environmental crises that exist are due to a failure to regulate and, less 
directly, to economic progress and the means by which it was effected.  Policy, according 
to Andrews, includes not only regulation as found in written form but also the obstacles 
of lack of regulation, as during the colonial period, and deregulation, as in the Ronald 
Reagan era.  As this study will explore, the primary obstacle to the enforcement of 
effective and progressive coastal zone management legislation in South Carolina was the 
concern of affected citizens.   
  In his examination of modern environmental politics, Hays has suggested that 
historical examination in this context is valuable because it can influence the usefulness 
of modern discussion and that historians, as observers rather than participants, may offer 
different and original observations.63  According to Hays, to properly analyze 
environmental regulation, one must look at the circumstances surrounding it, the groups 
influenced by it and the ends that will be served through it.64  This type of analysis is 
useful in the subject study; in South Carolina, strong opposition existed to an effective, 
                                                 
63 Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-
1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
64 Samuel P. Hays, A History of Environmental Politics Since 1945 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2000), 199. 
 27
scientifically sound coastal zone management policy if property rights were thereby 
affected.  This opposition was so strong that it influenced changes made to the legislation.   
The coastal zone is a battleground of interests, between public and private, citizen 
and government, economic and environmental, state and federal.  It encompasses 
concerns that affect everyone who come into contact with this region where land and sea 
meet and has even come to affect others who will never go there through its role in 
defining the relationship between citizens and government.  In this case, the voices of 
citizens were louder than those of scientists.  Despite the apparent need for tough 
regulation, protest from society that related to the diminution of property rights won the 
day in South Carolina.  Representatives responded to the concerns of their constituents 
and weakened the law, despite indications that stronger regulation was needed for the 
protection of coastal resources.   
Coastal zone regulation is a form of environmental regulation, statutes that are 
difficult to write and harder to implement.  Several factors make the composition and 
implementation of environmental regulation tricky.  First, environmental regulation is 
frequently based upon science, and changes in scientific knowledge or theory are 
frequent.  In the case of coastal zone management, scientific understanding of erosion 
and erosion-control devices evolved since the early 1970s and resulted in policy and 
legislative changes.  Second, environmental regulation can be costly.  For coastal zone 
management, sizeable expenses include renourishment of beaches and, potentially, 
acquisition of expensive oceanfront property.  In this case, legislators failed to take into 
account the economic consequences to individuals that were affected by the regulation, as 
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they looked only at the “big picture” of the state’s economy and its reliance on tourism.  
Another problem frequently associated with environmental regulation that is illustrated 
by coastal regulation is the reaction of groups within the subject society.  In South 
Carolina, there were citizens who supported strong coastal regulation and others who 
blasted such regulation.  Both used legal action to express their views.  These groups put 
more value on private property rights than on environmental protection.  The subject 
regulation was also made more difficult due to the fact that it applied to individuals who 
were inexperienced with regulation rather than to businesses.  Finally, nature can 
influence the form of environmental regulation.  Coastal zone management regulation in 
South Carolina was impacted by Hurricane Hugo.  
This study will look at the stages of South Carolina’s coastal zone management 
policy and regulation and will attempt to determine why these changes were made, 
considering especially the legal challenges made to the regulation in its strongest form 
and from where these challenges arose.  These changes, and the factors that led to them, 
are helpful in identifying the difficulties faced by legislators who seek to devise 
environmental regulation in all forms, and an evaluation of the legislation and policy is a 














“Administration is the most obvious part of government…It is government in 
action…” 
 --Woodrow Wilson 
 “The Study of Administration” 
American concern for the environment, at least as a major societal and political 
issue, can be traced to the 1960s and 1970s.65  Most of the modern environmental 
legislation at both the federal and state levels has its roots in this time period.  After 
hundreds of years of development and industrialization which largely ignored 
environmental consequences, a large segment of the American population began to see 
the effects of their neglect in the 1960s and 1970s.  High profile events, like the burning 
of the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio in 1969, and intriguing environmental 
literature, including Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 and the material of modern 
muckraker Ralph Nader, caught the interest and attention of a generation of social 
activists that had marched for civil rights and against Vietnam.66  Silent Spring alerted 
Americans to the dangers of pesticides and documented how environment factors are 
interconnected.  The public became increasingly aware of pollution through the 
development and advancement of ecology and through the goings-on of larger and more 
vocal activist groups.  Preservation of the environment and conservation became issues of 
general concern among the American public, amidst the many social changes that had 
occurred and were occurring in the United States since World War II.   
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Additionally, the prosperous post-war economy allowed many families to 
concentrate more on leisure than they had been able to before, consequently leading to a 
concern for the environmental quality of personal activities.67  Though environmental 
protection had been a public issue in the regulation-rich Progressive and New Deal eras, 
the level of public consciousness of environmental hazards and awareness of other 
environmental concerns in the 1960s and 1970s was greater than in any earlier period.68  
The environmental movement of this period is distinguishable from previous 
conservation movements, which sought to “conserve” nature through wise use for the 
future use of the human race. 
A turning point from the perspective of public involvement in environmental 
concerns was Earth Day.  On April 22, 1970, the first Earth Day was held.  The 
brainchild of Senator Gaylord Nelson, Democrat of Wisconsin, Earth Day was originally 
planned as a one day teach-in on college campuses about “The Crisis of the 
Environment.”69  A full-page advertisement for Earth Day ran in the Sunday New York 
Times on January 18, 1970: 
A disease has infected our country.  It has brought smog to Yosemite, dumped 
garbage in the Hudson, sprayed DDT in our food, and left our cities in decay.  Its 
carrier is man. 
Earth Day is a commitment to make life better, not just bigger and faster; to 
provide real rather than rhetorical solutions.  It is a day to re-examine the ethic of 
individual progress at mankind’s expense.  It is a day to challenge the corporate 
and governmental leaders who promise change, but who shortchange the 
necessary programs.  It is a day for looking beyond tomorrow.  April 22 seeks a 
future worth living.  April 22 seeks a future.70  
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The advertisement asked for responses and contributions, and both were received in great 
numbers.  Earth Day became a nationwide celebration.  The ad and its response also 
reflected how the environmental movement of this period differed from the conservation 
movement, which worked more with corporations than against them.  The day’s activities 
were loosely organized and varied widely depending on location.  Common events were 
picking up trash and planting trees, but residents of some locales showed greater 
creativity.  In San Francisco, a group poured oil into the reflecting pool in front of the 
office of Standard Oil of California in protest, and on Fifth Avenue in New York City 
demonstrators held up dead fish to passersby and shouted, “You’re next, people!”71  
Approximately 20 million Americans participated in the first Earth Day celebration.72  To 
many, Earth Day represents the launch of a full-scale environmental movement in the 
United States, a theory given credence both by the number of people who participated in 
the event and by what followed it.  
 There was a major increase in both activist groups themselves and in 
memberships in activist groups during this period, including an increase of about four 
hundred thousand members in the five largest environmental organizations in 1970 and 
1971.73  As a result of their size and visibility, these groups gained tremendous power.  
This growth is one of the factors frequently cited by historians when considering why 
environmentally protective regulations began to multiply in number and complexity in 
the early 1970s.  Regulation in general had expanded during the New Deal-era and had 
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proved to be effective in many situations.  This may be one reason the these groups, 
which had more members, money and power in the 1960s and 1970s, chose to go about 
environmental improvement through regulation as opposed to through direct action.   
One of the key reactions to Earth Day and the feelings and ideas represented 
therein came from the federal government.  This response involved legislation that 
included the National Environmental Policy Act and formation of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, Clean Water Act, Ocean Dumping Act, Endangered Species Act, 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Toxic Substances Control Act.  In 
fact, environmentally protective legislation was debated on and acted upon by every 
session of Congress from the beginning of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s.74  These 
lengthy statutes were vastly different from the environmental regulation that had 
preceded them, offering detailed instructions, procedures and criteria for the agencies that 
were produced.  Environmental historian Samuel P. Hays has noted that the size and scale 
of public institutions, including federal administrative bodies, grew at a pace similar to 
the growth of environmental values themselves in the period after World War II.75  What 
this means is that as people became more concerned about the environment, more 
agencies were created to oversee the environment.   
In 1972, the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) became law.  The CZMA 
states that “There is a national interest in the effective management, beneficial use, 
protection, and development of the coastal zone.”76  This measure was, as a general 
                                                 
74 Vogel, “The ‘New’ Social Regulation,” 161. 
75 Hays, “The Structure of Environmental Politics,” 724. 
76 Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S. Code Annotated §1451 et seq., 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451(a). 
 33
matter, part of the expansion of national environmental consciousness that was occurring 
in the United States.  In earlier years there had been no environmental concern regarding 
use of the coastal zone; coastal resources were viewed as unlimited in South Carolina and 
in the other coastal states.77  In addition to the problems that this attitude created, the 
coastal area was important and reflected a need for protection.  The coastal zone was vital 
to the nation and the individual states from economic and ecological standpoints, home to 
rich natural resources, numerous wildlife habitats, scenic beauty and recreational areas.78   
Specifically, the CZMA was a response to the recommendations of the Stratton 
Commission of the Commission of Marine Science, Engineering and Resources as set 
forth in a report, “Our Nation and the Sea,” issued in January 1969.  The Commission 
consisted of scientists, politicians and industry leaders and included representation from 
the Ford Foundation, the Department of the Interior and Standard Oil.79  This document 
made specific recommendations for coastal problems that were identified by the 
Commission.  The report recognized the unique nature of the area and the complexity of 
the problems that existed there and wanted a federal agency to oversee the care of the 
zone.  The Commission determined that the most effective administration would be by 
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the individual states but determined that the states currently lacked the machinery to 
properly manage the zone.  Because the coastal zone was unique to each state, and 
because the states used the area in a variety of ways, they would be more competent at 
managing their own coasts.  As a result, the Commission recommended that the federal 
government assist the states financially in establishing coastal zone authorities to plan, 
regulate, acquire lands and develop public facilities.80  Other factors played into the push 
for a federal program, including lobbying by environmental groups and requests by state 
governments.81  
Like any major federal legislation, consideration of what would become the 
CZMA involved plenty of political disagreement from the start:  President Richard Nixon 
wanted a national land-use law; most of Congress wanted a separate coastal statute; the 
oil industry was concerned about allowable ocean drilling; and many local governments 
worried about their roles being diluted if federal legislation, and subsequently control, 
was implemented.82  President Nixon, who apparently responded to the wishes of the oil 
industry in this controversy, supported the Department of the Interior because it promoted 
offshore drilling and development of deepwater ports to serve supertankers.83  A national 
land-use law would have allowed Interior to follow through with these projects.  Though 
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the national land-use law failed, the separate coastal management statute succeeded.  The 
states were unwilling to accept the kind of control that the national land-use law implied.  
Perhaps most importantly from the point of view of the Senate, the coastal management 
statute sent money back to the states, whereas the national land-use law would not have.  
Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Democrat of South Carolina, implied that this was one of the 
reasons for the Senate support: “This law [the Coastal Zone Management Act] would 
help hard-pressed coastal and Great Lakes states plan and manage development on lands 
and waters in their coastal zones.”84  Hays reasons that environmentalists tolerated the 
failure of the proposed national land-use law because they believed that large-scale 
industry favored such legislation.85  As a result, the environmentalists sided with 
Congress and supported the idea of a separate coastal management statute.   
After a separate coastal statute was agreed upon, the next big question was who 
would administer the program.  President Nixon backed the Department of the Interior, 
while congressional leaders favored the establishment of a new agency for the duties.86  
Congress finally prevailed, in large part under the leadership of Senator Hollings, Chair 
of the National Ocean Policy Study.87  As for a majority of the provisions of the CZMA, 
Congress was relying upon the recommendations of the Stratton Commission that had 
specifically recommended a new, consolidated agency for this role.  The Commission 
suggested combining the Environmental Science Services Administration, the U.S. Coast 
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Guard and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to form “the base for a major, viable 
Government agency…bringing to bear the scientific disciplines and other specialized 
knowledge required to initiate a diverse, broad-gauged effort.”88  The Commission 
thought that this joint organization might be called the National Ocean and Atmospheric 
Administration or NOAA.89  It was stated in the CZMA’s legislative history that the 
NOAA could offer “a broader and more balanced perspective.”90  Additionally, Senator 
Hollings told the Senate that “after careful review the committee believes that NOAA is 
the best qualified agency to undertake this complex task because of its capabilities for 
dealing with the interaction of land and water problems.”91  The input of the South 
Carolina senator provided an influential voice for his home state in the preparation of the 
CZMA. 
National policy as declared by Congress in the CZMA included the preservation, 
protection and development of the resources of the national coastal zone.  As to the 
states, Congress declared that national policy was “to encourage and assist the states to 
exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone through the development and 
implementation of management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water 
resources of the coastal zone, giving full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic and 
esthetic values as well as the needs for compatible economic development.”92  This 
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statement of policy indicated that economic considerations were not the only factors that 
should be considered for the maintenance of the zone.  It also demonstrated that it would 
be the states, not the federal government, that would make the actual rules.  The CZMA 
authorized federal grants-in-aid (money given by a governmental agency to an institution 
for a specific purpose), administered through the Secretary of Commerce.  To qualify for 
the federal money, a state needed to complete a specified planning process then submit its 
plan to the federal Office of Coastal Zone Management for approval.  To be considered 
for approval, a plan had to show how the state’s coastal zone would be defined, how 
permissible uses of land and water within the zone would be determined, a designation of 
areas of particular concern and an explanation of the legal infrastructure (laws and 
agencies) of the state’s program.  Once approved, the state was eligible for funding to 
implement and administer its coastal program.  The amount available was up to fifty 
percent of the total cost to the state for development of its program, with no set dollar 
limit.93  This approval process was cursory and most programs were accepted with no 
difficulty. 
Each state’s agency was given general authority to administer land and water use 
regulations.  Each state was also granted the specific power to acquire land through 
condemnation or other means when it was deemed necessary to achieve compliance with 
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its management plan.94  As a whole, the CZMA gave the individual states great freedom 
in designing and managing their distinct coastal zone management programs.  It was 
different from the majority of the federal administrative legislation enacted in the period 
preceding it in that it offered “carrots” (financial assistance) as opposed to “sticks” 
(threats to cut off federal funding).  The only standard for approval was that the Secretary 
of Commerce had to determine if the program met the basic requirements listed in the 
statute.  These requirements were: 1) that the state developed a program consistent with 
federal goals as stated in the CZMA; 2) that the program included coastal zone 
boundaries, permissible uses within the zone, designation of areas within the zone, 
identification of means of control, priorities of use, organizational structure of the 
program, definition of “beach,” planning process for energy facilities, process for the 
assessment and evaluation of erosion; 3) evidence of coordination with local plans and 
establishment of a mechanism for continuing consultation with local and state agencies; 
4) evidence of public hearings; 5) review by the governor; 6) designation of an agency to 
administer and implement the plan; 7) organization to implement the plan; 8) 
consideration of the national interest; 9) procedures for conserving areas with 
recreational, ecological, historical or aesthetic value; 10) designation of authority to 
administer land and water use control and to acquire fee simple interests in land 
necessary to achieve conformance with the program; 11) establishment of administrative 
review procedure; 12) method of assuring that unreasonable restrictions on land or water 
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use do not exist; 13) designation of areas of national significance; 14) public participation 
in permitting; and 15) mechanism for adherence by other state agencies.95    
The CZMA encouraged cooperation between the federal and state levels of 
government, especially since the state agencies had to meet certain federal guidelines 
(such as the consideration of the national interest when planning for energy facilities), 
recognize other federal legislation that affected the coastal zone, and cooperate with 
federal agencies that were already in place.96  For example, the Clean Air Act had 
implications for wetlands permitting, was involved in coastal pollution control, and 
established effluent standards for water pollutants.  If a state’s agency wanted to impose 
regulation that affected any of these variables, it needed to cooperate with the agency 
responsible for the administration of the Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection 
Agency.  The most important thing about the CZMA was that nothing was mandatory; 
states were free to act or not.  If they chose to act, the requirements to get federal funding, 
as discussed above, were modest.  As a result, South Carolina and the other coastal states 
had the freedom to design almost any kind of coastal program that they wanted and were 
able to take into consideration economic, geographic and political factors.  Most Atlantic 
coast states immediately responded to the offer of federal money and devised plans.  The 
only exception was Georgia; Georgia was willing to forego the free funds to maintain full 
and complete control of their coast.  Full autonomy was more important to Georgia than 
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the cash offered by Congress.  South Carolina, on the other hand, found the offer of 
funding easier to accept.   
South Carolina was hardly in the vanguard of environmental legislation and 
regulation in the period that came to be known as the “Green Decade,” and many 
southern states could be considered this way.  (Samuel P. Hays has noted that most of the 
interest in coastal environmental protection came from California and the northern 
Atlantic states.)97  While most other Atlantic coast states had enacted legislation to help 
protect at least their wetlands in the late 1960s and early 1970s, South Carolina 
legislators had failed to do even that at the time the CZMA was enacted.  Judging by the 
timeframe of the adoption of the CZMA and the South Carolina statute, the CZMA was 
the proximate cause of South Carolina’s General Assembly enactment of coastal 
legislation.  South Carolina legislators considered many variables when writing the first 
coastal legislation.          
First, the legislators considered the characteristics of the South Carolina coastal 
zone and how it was affected by nature.  The human desire for stable land-use patterns 
are in conflict with the dynamic nature of the coastal system.98  Erosion is a distinctive 
concern that both landowners and public users of the coastal zone must contend with and 
attempt to manage.  For this reason, people seek to control both their own behavior and as 
well as the behavior of nature so that coastal resources can be managed as effectively as 
possible, both from development and conservation standpoints.  Laws are one means of 
controlling and organizing the behaviors of human beings. 
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Because of the complexity of the coastal zone, numerous values come into play 
when considering how to regulate activities.  Social ecologist Stephen Kellert has argued 
that different segments of the population place different values on the coastal zone.  
These include aesthetic values (the coast as a source of beauty and other physical 
attributes), scientific values (the coast as a source of opportunities for scientific research 
and understanding), humanistic values (the coast as a vehicle for bonds with nature), 
naturalistic values (the coast as an area for exploration of and contact with nature) and 
utilitarian values (the coast as a source of material and commodity benefits).99  As a 
result, writing laws to govern the coastal area is a challenging process.  Coastal zone 
legislation is frequently contentious and, as was the case for South Carolina, may take 
several years to formulate in its final composition.   
Soon after the passage of the CZMA, South Carolina started toward coastal zone 
legislation.  In August 1973, Governor John West, through executive order, created the 
South Carolina Coastal Zone Planning and Management Council.  The body was made up 
of eleven members, taken from the heads of state agencies and elected representatives, 
and was charged with drafting and developing a management program for the coastal 
zone in accordance with the provisions of the CZMA.  Several attempts at legislation by 
this group were unsuccessful because the General Assembly could not decide how 
powerful the regulation should be, and the challenges came from every level of the 
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process.  Some bills were defeated in the House, some in the Senate and some were 
vetoed by the Governor.     
In 1977, the Senate Fish, Game and Forestry Committee sponsored a compromise 
bill (S280) which passed the Senate and the House in May with only slight amendment.  
Governor Edwards signed the bill into law on May 24, 1977.  Act 123 of 1977, the South 
Carolina Coastal Management Act, established the South Carolina Coastal Council, 
which, on July 1, 1997, became an official agency.  It also provided for the development 
and administration of a coastal zone management program by the Council, including the 
authority to issue and deny permits in critical areas as of September 28, 1977, as well as 
authorizing legal proceedings to settle claims of private individuals to tidelands below the 
mean high water mark.100      
The Coastal Council, the new agency created to administer the act, was an 18-
member commission, with eight members to be chosen by the governing bodies of the 
coastal counties, six to be chosen from the coastal Congressional districts by the Senators 
and Representatives of those districts and four members taken directly from the state’s 
Senate and House.  All members were to serve four-year terms, except for the four 
legislative members, who were to continue as long as they remained members of the 
General Assembly.101  The legislative members were motivated to perform as their 
constituents wished, or they could suffer the consequences of voter displeasure in the 
next election.  The other members did not share this motivation, as they were not elected 
officials. 
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The policies and directives of the Council were to be formulated under the 
umbrella policy of the Act: “ ‘ to protect the quality of the coastal environment and to 
promote the economic and social improvement of the coastal zone and all the people of 
the State.’ ”102  The chief purpose of the Act was stated as “the proper management of the 
natural, recreational, commercial and industrial resources of the State’s coastal zone—
resources of present and potential value to all citizens of the State.”103  Because of the 
earlier failed attempts, this type of broad language was probably necessary for the 
legislation to carry favor with both houses and the governor.  There was little opposition 
from coastal property owners and commercial developers to this original legislation, 
which imposed few actual limits on construction, especially since the shoreline was 
highly developed already.  (There were no setback provisions that required a certain 
distance be kept from the beach in the original legislation.)  The permitting process did 
not affect people who already had a house, and people who owned undeveloped property 
could still seek a permit for construction, which they had no reason to believe would not 
be approved given the advanced condition of development at that time.  
  William Eichbaum has noted that there is no single, unified public or uniform set 
of values regarding the coastal zone.  Groups tend to find management and policies 
constructive when the use they make of the coastal zone is protected.104  Developers and 
commercial property owners (those using the property for commercial purposes such as 
hotels) are generally hostile to laws that limit where or how they can build on their 
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property.  This has been true for coastal property in South Carolina, but it was not 
exhibited until after the original legislation was amended.  
The state granted the Council two general types of management authority.  As to 
the critical areas, defined as coastal waters, tidelands, beaches and primary sand dunes, 
the Council received direct control through the permitting program.  The Council was 
given the exclusive authority to issue or deny applications for alterations of any critical 
areas.  What this means is that a property owner who wanted to build a house, walkway 
or other structure on a critical area (such as a dune) would have to apply to the Council 
for permission.  The Council was free to either approve or deny the permit after 
considering certain factors required by the Act, including effects on the production of fish 
and other natural resources, effects on endangered species and their habitats, effects on 
public access to recreational areas and the impact on historical and archaeological 
sites.105  A permit appeals process was provided for, with direct appeals to the Council 
itself.  If the property owner was denied a permit, he or she would have to ask the 
Council to reconsider their decision before he or she could take any other action.  An 
aggrieved party could also appeal to the circuit court of the county where the project was 
to be located, namely a “last resort.”   
The second type of authority granted to the Council was “indirect.”  In all the 
counties that were included in the coastal zone by definition, the Council was granted 
“indirect control.”106  This “indirect” authority was to be implemented through Council 
certification of permits of other agencies and through memoranda of agreement between 
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the Council and other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
National Park Service, both of which had power to make certain determinations within 
the coastal zone.107  More specifically, the Council was directed to manage certain areas 
and activities, including pipeline corridors and estuarine and marine sanctuaries.108  
Overall, power outside the limited areas defined as “critical” was modest.  What this 
means in terms of development is that a property owner did not have to ask the Council 
for permission to build outside the critical areas.  The Council was also designated to 
develop and implement a beach erosion control program.  The body was granted permit 
jurisdiction over erosion control structures not otherwise covered by law, meaning that a 
permit was required before a new erosion control device could be constructed, unless it 
fell in an area that was covered by another agency (such as the National Park Service). 
This first statute, while stronger than no regulation, was weak and allowed the 
Council little control over construction or erosion-control devices, the two primary 
human-made sources of erosion in South Carolina.  Essentially, a permit was only denied 
if “the project would permanently disrupt a priority use” of a Geographic Area of 
Particular Concern (critical area).109  These uses varied by area but in general were 
characterized by economic, environmental or recreational value.  For example, a permit 
that requested to build a structure that would block public access to a highly-used 
recreational beach could and should be denied under the provisions of the original 
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legislation.  In reality, few permits were denied; this is likely because the regulations 
were unspecific and vague and because of public pressure to continue development.    
As a result, these types of structures, in the form of private houses and 
commercial businesses, continued to proliferate along the coast.  Development continued, 
largely unhindered by the regulation, as did the erection of erosion-control devices like 
seawalls by private property owners.  As the prices for coastal real estate rose, so too did 
the number of hard defenses and, subsequently, the severity of erosion.  As a result of this 
initial legislation, the condition of the coastal zone did not improve.  
 
The CZMA was part of a larger movement toward environmental consciousness 
that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.  It was a response to a perceived need for 
regulation of this finite resource, based upon degradation and conflicts in use, as well as 
to a general societal movement.  In that it motivated most coastal states to initiate their 
own coastal planning policies and processes, it was certainly a positive step.  However, 
its very flexibility, which allowed each state to customize its program to best fit its 
unique coastal qualities, was also one of its weaknesses.  In striving for elasticity, the 
CZMA had so few requirements and obligations that states had too much freedom.  In 
short, some states enacted an ineffective program or made changes to existing programs 
that rendered them ineffective.  What each state chose to do with the resources offered by 
the CZMA was their decision, and they were given little guidance under the CZMA.   
South Carolina’s first attempt at coastal zone management legislation involved a 
contentious process of give and take in the General Assembly.  Because of the many 
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conflicting users of the area and due to the competing values related to the zone, the 
legislation that evolved was necessarily broad.  Yet this statute was a good starting point 
for the state, seeking as it did to properly manage and protect the coastal zone.  The 
General Assembly recognized the importance of the coastal zone, but it was also 
motivated by the financial assistance offered by the CZMA. 
This initial legislation established the South Carolina Coastal Council to oversee 
the implementation of the new policies.  The Council was given authority, via a 
permitting process, over the area deemed “critical,” but this area was small.  In short, the 
Council had modest authority (it could deny permits in theory but rarely did) over a 
limited amount of land (when compared to the state’s full coastal zone).  The Council’s 
authority to control development on primary sand dunes, while a great improvement from 
the previous situation (i.e.—no regulation), was also modest.  As a result, development 
near the shoreline continued to accumulate at a rapid pace.  South Carolina’s primary 
concern was in limiting construction and development in certain areas, particularly those 
in close proximity to the beach and its associated erosion zones, but because the 
permitting process was so relaxed, not much got done.  Natural processes remained, and 
the anxiety associated with erosion still plagued “front-row” property owners (those who 
owned lots directly adjacent to the beach and/or primary oceanfront dunes).  Their 
response, in many cases, was to erect a seawall that exacerbated erosion farther down the 







“In Florida and Louisiana, and the Carolinas in 1989, people found out, yes, it can 
be that bad…” 
 --Cathy Henry, North Carolina Division of Emergency Preparedness110 
 
“…everyone who hears these words of mine and puts them into practice is like a 
wise man who built his house on the rock.  The rain came down…the winds blew 
and beat against that house; yet it did not fall, because it had its foundation on the 
rock.  But everyone who…does not…is like a foolish man who built his house on 
sand.  The rain came down…and the winds blew and beat against that house, and 
it fell with a great crash.” 
 --Matthew 7:24-27 
 
The Coastal Council recognized that the protection of the coastal zone was not 
progressing as well as had been hoped when South Carolina’s first coastal zone 
management legislation was enacted.  After the initial statute had been in place for almost 
ten years, the condition of the beaches had not improved.  In October 1986, the Council 
appointed the Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront Management to investigate beach 
and dune erosion in South Carolina and to make recommendations to improve the 
situation.  The Committee was made up of developers, environmentalists, and state and 
local representatives.111  The following March, the Committee issued its report, finding 
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that “the South Carolina beach/dune system is now in a state of crisis.”112  The 
Committee’s report stated that over 57 miles of the state’s beaches were critically 
eroding, which it attributed to three principal factors:  rising sea levels, poorly planned 
development that was infringing upon the beach/dune system and an overall lack of 
comprehensive beach management planning.113  (The sea level rose over one foot in the 
20th century, thereby consuming approximately 1,000 feet of beach.  Though some 
changes in sea level are normal, this dramatic rise is usually attributed to global 
warming.)114   
The Committee’s report noted that the “shoreline is a resource which is vitally 
important to the citizens of this state and to the state’s economy as it annually attracts 
millions of visitors and generates approximately two-thirds of the state’s annual $3.75 
billion dollar tourist industry.”115  The Committee sought to protect the coast as a 
resource for the state and its economy, but the economic situation of individual coastal 
property owners was not considered in the committee’s findings nor was it considered in 
the recommendations made to the General Assembly.   
 The Committee further concluded that the South Carolina Coastal Zone 
Management Act had been ineffective in controlling development because “too little 
authority over the beach/dune system was given to the Coastal Council which is 
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responsible for administering the Act.”116  In turn, the Committee determined that the 
Council was unable to prevent unwise placement of structures (both homes and 
businesses) near the eroding areas.  The Council did not have enough power to make and 
enforce the kinds of decisions that needed to be made in terms of structural siting.  There 
were no defined rules about when a permit had to be denied.  Additionally, the 
Committee noted that many owners of oceanfront property sought and received permits 
from the Council to erect erosion-control devices such as seawalls and bulkheads, most of 
which actually resulted in increased erosion and other negative effects.117  The 
Committee’s report seemed to suggest that the Coastal Council must be given hard, 
definite rules under which permit requests would be denied.  Otherwise, it seemed as 
though the Council granted most applications for permits.  The Commission proposed a 
way to give the Council legislative power to deny permits for lots that had not been 
developed or in case a structure was destroyed.  The proposed rules would require a 
denial in set, defined situations, decreasing discretionary decisions.        
 The Committee set forth recommendations for future coastal zone management, 
featuring “The Thirty-Year Retreat Policy.”  This policy included the determination of a 
“Setback Line,” which the Committee defined as “the location of the Base Line [the 
location of the crest of a typical primary ocean front dune] based on a 30-year landward 
projection as determined by historical erosion rate and not influenced by erosion control 
structures or nourishment.”118  The Setback Line was significant because the Committee 
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recommended that, following the effective date of the legislation, no new structures could 
be constructed seaward of the Setback Line unless the owner met certain stated 
conditions (such as having the lot platted prior to the effective date of the legislation, 
providing a plan for removal of the structure if that were to become necessary and 
obvious conditions such as meeting local building and zoning codes) AND received a 
permit for such construction from the Council.119  In practice, this meant that unless a 
property owner’s construction planning had progressed significantly and was relatively 
small (since it would have to be moveable), the party would not be able to build in this 
zone.  Also, it meant that if a house or other structure was destroyed, it could not be 
rebuilt if the lot was located within the zone.       
Setbacks are extremely useful in coastal zone management.  The purpose of 
designating setbacks or a setback line is to exclude certain uses, most often the 
construction of structures, from the areas close to the shoreline.  The Council could use a 
setback for multiple purposes, including the avoidance of damage from flooding and 
erosion to structures, protection of ecological functions or ecologically critical or 
sensitive areas, and the protection of public access to the shoreline (i.e.—to keep property 
owners from building in such a way that public visitors are discouraged from going to the 
shoreline.)  Shoreline setbacks differ from program to program; they can be designed as a 
uniform distance (such as 100 feet) or may be dictated by a natural feature.120  
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In 1988, the General Assembly, specifically citing the report of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Beachfront Management that had been appointed by the Council, 
determined that the legislation in place to protect the coastal zone was inadequate, finding 
that it “did not provide adequate jurisdiction to the South Carolina Coastal Council to 
enable it to effectively protect the integrity of the beach/dune system.”121  As a result, the 
General Assembly found, development had proceeded in close proximity to the 
beach/dune system, resulting in accelerated erosion and other problematic 
consequences.122 
To combat these issues, the General Assembly, in July 1988, adopted substantial 
amendments to the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act, commonly referred to 
as the Beachfront Management Act (BMA).  The most vigorous provision in these 
amendments was the retreat policy:  the BMA established a forty-year retreat from the 
shoreline policy that called for a gradual retreat from the beachfront over the prescribed 
period.123  What this means is that they planned for future development to move away 
from the beach until it reached a point that erosion would no longer affect it.  
Additionally, this would make the structures less vulnerable to hurricanes.  Houses that 
are located farther from the beach are less vulnerable to storm surge.  Using historical 
data (including aerial photographs) on the location of shoreline, the Council drew the 
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baseline at the innermost (i.e.--most landward) point at which the shoreline had been 
located within the last forty years.  Beyond that point, the BMA banned development.124   
As previously discussed, these types of regulations are frequently referred to as 
“setbacks” or “setback regulations.”  Setbacks can be thought of as a type of zoning, in 
that they allow only certain structures to be built in certain areas, while disallowing other 
types of development or specific structures in various places.  Setbacks are extremely 
important in coastal communities because they force developers or landowners to build 
far enough back from the shoreline so that structures will not be in an overly dangerous 
position when exposed to coastal storms.  Additionally, they allow dunes and shorelines 
to be conserved.  This was a crucial development in support of South Carolina’s overall 
policy, which was to control where and how development occurred.  This was 
controversial because development was not allowed over an invisible line.  Theoretically, 
this could mean that entire lots could not be used from a development perspective.  In 
other words, a property owner could be faced with an expensive oceanfront lot that he or 
she could not build a house on after the passage of the BMA.  Even more likely was the 
possibility that a property owner could only use part of a lot or lots.  It was not highly 
controversial when it was passed because most of the oceanfront lots in South Carolina 
were already developed.  It would become much more contentious when scores of homes 
were destroyed or severely damaged by Hurricane Hugo, since these property owners 
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then had to apply for permits for construction if their lot or a portion of it extended over 
the line.     
Almost immediately, the setback provision was questioned by property owners, 
but it was not an issue for the majority of property owners (since most already had 
houses, hotels or whatever they wanted to build).  By July 20, days after the passage of 
the BMA, the Council indicated to Isle of Palms property owner Robert Willms Jr. that 
he would have either have to move his new oceanfront home, which was under 
construction at the time, or tear it down, as it fell seaward of the baseline by about eighty 
feet.  Surprisingly, Willms was not upset that he had to move the construction; he was 
only displeased because he wanted a clear and definitive answer from the Council about 
where the house could be placed.  “All I want is a decision.  I’m upset because I can’t get 
an answer from them.  I’ve got a contract to build a house and they have not allowed 
work to continue.”  Willms added that he would comply with the decision of the Council 
if it were to move the construction by ten feet but added that “I’m not moving back 80 
feet without contesting.”125  This conflict was illustrative of several that occurred 
between property owners and the Council in the early days of the BMA.  Property owners 
were generally unsure how the BMA affected them, and the Council was unable to give 
to-the-point answers as they were still gathering data and had not yet made a final 
decision on the setback line in some areas.  Most of the property owners affected by the 
law were individuals who had little or no experience with governmental regulation.  They 
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did not know what kinds of questions to ask, and few had participated in the formative 
stages of the law.    
“Critical area” was amended in the BMA to include the “beach/dune system 
which is the area from the mean high-water mark to the setback line as determined in 
Section 48-39-280,” as well as the previously included coastal waters, tidelands and 
beaches.126  This was one of the most important sections of the amendments passed, as it 
significantly increased the areas over which the Council had direct authority to control 
future development.  What these amendments meant to property owners was that the 
Council could deny the request of a property owner to build on land that was not actually 
part of the present day beach or dunes because it might be in the future.  On February 11, 
1991, the South Carolina Supreme Court held, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, that the BMA was constitutional.127  (The Lucas case and its subsequent judicial 
history will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five.) 
In May 1991, the Council published its updated Regulations, including those 
pertaining to permitting in critical areas of the coastal zone.  Members noted therein, as 
had the Blue Ribbon Committee and the General Assembly earlier, that their previous 
authority had been inadequate, writing that the 1977 legislation “proved ineffective for 
managing the beach/dune system because regulatory authority over these areas given to 
the Coastal Council was not sufficient.  From the State’s beaches, the Council could 
previously regulate landward only to the primary oceanfront sand dune or to the highest 
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uprush of waves where no such dune existed.” (emphasis added)128  As a result, many 
landowners had continued to build as close to the water as possible and then sought 
permits from the Council to build erosion control devices to protect their unwisely sited 
and now erosion-endangered structures.  With their new authority, the Council could 
regulate all new oceanfront development.     
The purpose of the new Regulations was to “aid developers and others in taking 
advantage of the state-of-the-art techniques in developing projects compatible with the 
natural environment; [to] insure consistent permit evaluation by Council and staff; and 
[to] serve as a stimulus for implementation of better and more consistent management 
efforts for the coastal zone.”129  The major changes from previous Council policies were 
due to the body’s increased level of power via the 1988 Beachfront Management Act, 
including the rejection of erosion control devices and the adoption of the policies of 
renourishment and retreat.130  (Beach renourishment involves the excavation of sand from 
one site and placement of this sand on an existing but retreating beach to slow the 
landward retreat of the beach.)131  Through 1996, South Carolina spent over $50 million 
on approximately twenty-eight distinct renourishment projects.132 
The renourishment issue was significant because that is primary solution that was 
advocated by some groups who opposed adoption of the BMA and the setback provision, 
particularly developers and commercial property owners.  South Carolina’s forty-nine 
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savings and loan institutions became vocal opponents of the BMA.  They argued that a 
setback provision would devalue coastal property and that renourishment was the best 
way to ensure a healthy beach.133   
In addition to the problems they can cause, these types of structures do not 
provide definite protection—nearly every seawall within the reach of Hurricane Hugo 
was overtopped by waves and storm surge.134  Like South Carolina, North Carolina and 
Maine have also banned the construction of permanent shore-hardening structures.135  
Like the setback provision, the feature that denied property owners the ability to construct 
erosion control devices was quickly protested.  Days after the passage of the BMA, the 
Council heard an appeal from Robert and Alice Beard.  The Beards had been denied 
permission to build a seawall (a popular type of erosion-control device) across a lot on 
Cherry Grove (an area located just north of North Myrtle Beach) and to move three 
existing seawalls on contiguous lots seaward.  The request was denied by Council staff 
and upheld by the full Council.136 
Any regulation or other legislation that affects the ability of private property 
owners to develop or modify their land will usually be subject to protest.  As a result, it 
was apparent that the BMA would meet with challenges.  It was unexpected, however, 
that the first and most significant challenge to the BMA would result from the activities 
of nature itself, in the form of a massive hurricane and its effects on the South Carolina 
coastal zone and the structures located there. 
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While most relevant factors (see Table Three) affect the coastline subtly and over 
time, the most dramatic instances of change and erosion are caused by coastal storms, 
especially hurricanes.  Hurricanes are responsible for the majority of the storm-related 
damage to coastal property in the United States.137  These monster storms affect coastal 
structures in several ways.  First, hurricanes cause an abnormal rise in sea level known as 
“storm surge.”  Storm surge causes flooding and can be particularly harmful if the 
hurricane makes landfall at high tide.  Hurricane waves are also dangerous for coastal 
structures, particularly those that are “oceanfront.”  In addition to throwing water strongly 
against the shore, waves can also move floating objects, like boats, piers, and dislodged 
structures, against the shore and against structures located there.  Higher than normal 
waves can also move sand away from the beach, potentially causing collapse and erosion 
of nearby land and, subsequently, structures.138 
Hurricanes and other storms affect different parts of the coastal zone in various 
manners.  The most unstable areas of the United States coastline are the Atlantic barrier 
islands. They are extremely vulnerable to storms, and debris taken from them by storms 
can damage inland property.  (Barrier islands, formed of loosely consolidated materials, 
are extremely vulnerable to wind and waves, both of which are increased dramatically by 
hurricanes.  Consequently, the size, shape and location of barrier islands are always 
changing.)139  South Carolina’s barrier islands include the Isle of Palms and Sullivan’s 
                                                 
137 Pilkey and others, The North Carolina Shore, 20.  Many states on the East Coast of the United States 
also suffer from winter storm, known as northeasters.  South Carolina, unlike North Carolina, has been 
spared major damage from northeasters in modern times. 
138 Pilkey and others, The North Carolina Shore, 218-19. 
139 Beatley, Brower and Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 19. 
 59
Island, both located near Charleston.  These islands are fully developed, and property 
there is especially costly.140     
A coastal storm is classified by the maximum sustained winds that it contains.  A 
storm is referred to as a “tropical storm” when its maximum sustained winds reach thirty-
eight miles per hour.  Once the maximum sustained winds reach seventy-four miles per 
hour, it is then classified as a hurricane and given a “human” name.  Hurricanes are 
evaluated via the Saffir-Simpson Scale, which uses a rating system that ranks hurricanes 
























1 74-96 3-5 Minimal: Most damage 
is to plant life, with little 




2 97-111 6-8 Moderate: Major damage 
to mobile homes and 
some damage to roofing 
materials of other 
structures. Evacuation of 
shoreline and low-lying 





3 112-131 9-12 Extensive: Large trees 
may be blown down. 
Mobile homes destroyed. 




                                                 
140 Property values for single family homes on the Isle of Palms range from $579,998 to $7,380,000. 
Property values on Sullivan’s Island range for single family homes range from $889,000 to $5,499,000, 
based on information provided by www.realtor.com on March 17, 2008. 
141 Table Three is adapted from Beatley, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 38-9 and Tom 
Rubillo, Hurricane Destruction in South Carolina: Hell and High Water (Charleston: History Press, 2006). 
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shoreline, and many 
small structures near the 
shoreline will be 
destroyed. Evacuation 
may be necessary for 
several blocks within 
several blocks of 
shoreline. 
4 132-155 13-18 Extreme: Extensive 
damage to roofing, 
windows and doors, with 
many complete roof 
failures. Flat terrain 10 
feet or less above sea 
level flooded inland as 
far as 6 miles. 
Evacuation of all 
residences within 500 
yards of shore or within 
two miles if only one 




5 156+ 19+ Catastrophic: Severe 
damage to roofing, 
windows and doors, with 
many complete roof 
failures. Many complete 
building failures. Major 
damage to lower floors 
of structures less than 15 
feet above sea level 
within 500 yards of 
shoreline. Evacuation of 
residential areas within 
10 miles of shore 
possibly needed. 
None known in 
North or South 
Carolina. An 
example of a 
Category 5 is 
Hurricane 
Camille, which 
was blamed for 
over 250 deaths 
in the Gulf 




The problems of coastal construction led to a series of efforts by the federal 
government to enact helpful regulations, the first being the creation of a federal flood 
insurance program in 1968.  It was launched primarily as an alternative to federal disaster 
relief.  As part of the program, communities were required to establish land-use controls 
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or other means of limiting the impact of potential floods.  Though these responses were 
beneficial, they were not as effective as had been hoped, and hurricane-related floods 
continued to wreak havoc on the coastal zone of the United States.  142 
South Carolina’s hurricane history, while not as severe as that of North Carolina, 
Florida or the Gulf Coast, does contain several storms of consequence that resulted in a 




Hurricanes Affecting South Carolina by Decade, 1800-2000 
Decade Number of Hurricanes 
Affecting South Carolina 
Category Three or Higher 
1800 4 Yes 
1810 4 Yes 
1820 3 Yes 
1830 4 No 
1840 1 No 
1850 2 No 
1860 1 No 
1870 2 No 
1880 4 Yes 
1890 7 Yes 
1900 3 No 
1910 2 No 
1920 1 No 
1930 1 No 
1940 2 No 
1950 6 Yes 
1960 1 No 
1970 2 No 
1980 3 Yes 
1990 3 No 
 
                                                 
142 Tim Searchinger, “Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: An Enigmatic Approach to the 
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Movement, ed. John D. Echeverria and Raymond Booth Eby (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1995), 169-
181. 
143 Table Four is adapted from Rubillo, Hurricane Destruction in South Carolina.   
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As demonstrated by Table Four, South Carolina, between the 1960s and 1989, 
experienced a lull in major hurricanes.  As a result, many residents of the coastal zone 
had not experienced a major hurricane when Hugo struck in 1989, either because they 
were too young to remember the last major storm or because they moved to the coastal 
zone from a non-coastal region during a less active period.  This is likely a major factor 
that led to increased development in the highly hazardous areas of the coastal zone.144  
The low level of major hurricanes between 1966 and 1997, during which time only five 
major hurricanes struck the East Coast, corresponded with enormous growth along the 
entire eastern seaboard.  Younger and newer residents were simply unaware of the 
tremendous destruction that hurricanes, particularly major ones, can cause.145  Table Four 
also reveals that the likelihood of a major hurricane in any ten or even twenty year period 
is low.  These odds may have given coastal landowners a false sense of security regarding 
the level of danger to which their property is exposed.  Storms do not occur in a regular 
pattern or spacing; just because there was a forty-five year gap between Hurricanes Hazel 
and Hugo does not mean that another major hurricane will not strike South Carolina until 
2034.  Hurricanes are unpredictable, except in how they affect coastal structures. 
In 1954, Hurricane Hazel skirted the South Carolina coast after killing almost 
1,000 people in Haiti.  Hazel’s storm surge, at 14.5 feet, grinded and crushed the beaches 
of the Grand Strand, from Pawleys Island to Little River.  Windy Hill, today part of 
North Myrtle Beach, was completely destroyed.  Eighty percent of the oceanfront and 
adjacent structures were destroyed in Myrtle Beach.  Amazingly, Hazel had not directly 
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hit to the South Carolina coast.  This storm did not make landfall until reaching the of 
North Carolina coast.146  Nevertheless, the effects wrought by the incredible storm surge 
and high winds were devastating.  Long-time South Carolina residents recall Hazel as the 
only memorable storm to affect South Carolina before Hurricane Hugo.  The next 
significant hurricane to affect the South Carolina coast was Hurricane Gracie, which 
made landfall in Beaufort County in October 1959.  Gracie contained sustained winds of 
120 miles per hour and gusts up to 138 miles per hour.  Gracie was blamed for four 
deaths and damage to 2,394 homes.147   
In respect to hurricanes, the period between 1961 and 1980 became the most 
lackluster in recorded history on the east coast and corresponds to the increase of coastal 
development.  Though these years neither slowed development nor increased the caution 
of developers.  This phenomenon has been referred to as “a lack of appreciation for 
dynamic processes.”148  This period saw a surge in building in the coastal zone, both in 
terms of housing and resort development, and there was little coastal storm activity to 
deter or slow the rush.149  Other factors, including the growth in personal income and an 
increased standard of living, improved accessibility via the private automobile and 
interstate highway system and learned patterns of beach users, helped stimulate rapid 
development of the coastal zone of the southeastern United States.150  However, the lack 
of major hurricanes in this period is a frequently cited factor when considering the rapid 
increase in development.  In 1979, for example, Hurricane David hit the South Carolina 
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coast and single-handedly cut away between ten and twenty feet of the foredunes in 
Horry County.  Yet it had little impact on the intense construction that was occurring in 
the area.151  Between 1972 and 1978, the number of visitors to the Grand Strand alone 
had gone from 2.9 million to 6.5 million, making it one of the most popular vacation 
areas on the east coast.  Accommodations increased as visitors multiplied, and 
development in Horry County soared.152   
South Carolina has been spared the hit of a Category Five hurricane, at least in 
modern times.  Hurricane Hugo, which dealt the state a direct strike in 1989, was a 
Category Four storm.  On September 5, Hugo was known only as Tropical Depression 
11.  On September 20, the storm, then named as Hugo, had resulted in the issuance of a 
hurricane warning for the entire South Carolina coast, though it was still at sea, several 
hundred miles southeast of Charleston.  By 7 a.m. on September 21, the lower coastal 
counties were already experiencing rain and 40 mile per hour winds as Hugo approached.  
By sundown, Hugo was classified as Category Four hurricane, with gusts higher than 150 
miles per hour.  Around 11 p.m., Hugo made landfall near McClellanville, immediately 
north of Mount Pleasant and Charleston.  The eye of the storm passed over Charleston at 
approximately 11:50 p.m.  By 5 a.m., it was apparent to those who had ventured outside 
that the damage to the coastal zone was calamitous.  Twenty-six people died, and almost 
65,000 had to find temporary shelter.153   
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 Soon after Hugo, President George H. Bush declared twenty-four counties in 
South Carolina, including six counties in the coastal zone (Beaufort and Jasper being the 
exceptions), to be “Disaster Counties.”  The damage in these twenty-four counties was 
estimated at $6.4 billion.154  Almost 80,000 single family homes were damaged, with 
nearly 4,000 of those being completely destroyed.  In Charleston and Berkeley Counties 
alone, over 40,000 homes were damaged, with over 10,000 incurring major damage or 
being completely destroyed.155  Disturbingly, the effects could have been worse:  the true 
erosional potential of this level of hurricane was not even realized because of the rapid 
forward motion of the storm.  Hugo moved at approximately twenty-four-miles-per-hour, 
more than twice the normal rate of progression.156 
 Hugo destroyed almost every foredune north of Kiawah Island, though some of 
the sand shifted only temporarily to protect the beach.  Some beaches fared worse than 
others, losing large amounts of sand that were washed inland.  Emergency expenditures 
for beach renourishment were close to $10 million, and projects planned for the 1990-
1995 period carried a price tag of $62 million.  Soon after Hugo, scraping of dunes from 
available sand on the beach was required to preserve property endangered by the loss of 
dunes and by the high tides that occurred after Hugo.157  
 The effects of Hugo varied by location and were based on a number of factors.  
Areas with wide beaches and substantial dunes were more protected from the storm surge 
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created by Hugo since the beaches acted as buffer zones.  The more narrow beaches, 
many with a history of erosion, were most heavily affected.  Development near the shore 
in locations with more narrow beaches suffered severe damage, despite efforts by some 
residents to fortify the beach with large stones or concrete rubble.158  Dunes all along the 
coast were severely damaged.  On October 5, South Carolina began a project costing 
approximately $100,000 per mile to rebuild dunes along about sixty-five miles of beach 
where the dunes were most affected by Hugo.159  While this project was viewed with 
criticism by scientists who favored allowing the sand to return to the dunes in its natural 
cycle, other scientists approved the program since it would provide protection to 
structures behind the dune system.  This was deemed necessary because of excessively 
high tides expected because of a close alignment of the moon to Earth.160 
 Hugo was the most damaging hurricane in United States history prior to 
Hurricane Andrew.  Hugo was not an overly large storm; as coastal researchers have 
noted, it caused such a large amount of damage because of the level of development in 
the low-lying coastal areas.  Hugo’s storm surge in Charleston measured 12.9 feet.  In 
comparison, when Hurricane Camille made landfall in Mississippi in 1969, it included a 
22.4 foot storm surge, yet the property damage it caused was drastically less than that 
inflicted by Hugo, primarily because of development practices.161  Another important 
consideration is that the damage would have been much worse had the storm struck south 
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of Charleston instead of north.162  Fortunately, the highest storm surge was experienced 
just north of the storm, near the mostly undeveloped area known as Bull’s Bay.  South 
Carolina was also fortunate that Hugo moved quickly, since the full erosion potential of 
the storm was not realized.163  
 Folly Beach, despite being on the south side of the storm, experienced severe 
damage, even when compared to other barrier island communities.  The primary factor 
involved in the damage to Folly Beach was its high rate of erosion.  In the fifty years 
preceding Hugo, an entire row of houses on Folly Beach had been lost to erosion.164  (To 
put this figure into perspective, single family homes on Folly currently range from 
$445,000 to $3,470,000.)  A comparison to the damage suffered on the Isle of Palms, 
which, like Folly Beach, endured a storm surge of twelve feet, is useful.  Beachfront 
houses on the Isle of Palms, though suffering water damage, generally survived because 
of the wide beaches and substantial dunes that were present.165  Sullivan’s Island, which 
required a local setback of one hundred yards for development, resulted in fairly good 
conditions for structures during Hugo.166  This is not to de-emphasize the extent of 
damage done to the Isle of Palms, Sullivan’s Island and the structures located on both, as 
it was severe.  In fact, it was several weeks before either the Isle of Palms or Sullivan’s 
Island could be accessed by car since the only vehicular route to these barrier islands, 
Ben Sawyer Bridge, had been blown off its pilings.  (The bridge was not hoisted out of 
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the waterway and back into place until October 5.)167  The comparison to Folly Beach is 
only to show that areas with wider beaches and stronger setback requirements fared better 
than those without them.     
 In addition to the wind and water, the Beachfront Management Act would have 
something to say about how the oceanfront would look after the hurricane.  When Hugo 
made landfall in South Carolina, the BMA contained “some of the most stringent 
reconstruction provisions in the country.”168  While it had been contested here and there 
by a few property owners between its enactment and Hugo, it really had not affected that 
many property owners because the coast was already so developed.  It affected numerous 
additional property owners after Hugo.  Based on the policy of retreat contained in the 
legislation, many homes destroyed or damaged by Hugo could not be rebuilt.  The BMA 
included restrictions both on new construction and on reconstruction in the event of a 
hurricane.  A structure deemed “damaged beyond repair” could be rebuilt in the setback 
zone, but the reconstruction had to meet several requirements.  The Council deemed 
structures determined to be damaged 66 and two-thirds or more to be destroyed beyond 
repair.169  First, the construction had to be located at least twenty feet landward of the 
most landward point of the baseline.  The new structure also could not exceed the original 
square footage, and the owner of the structure was required to renourish the beach in 
front of the structure on a yearly basis (unless it was already involved in a federal or state 
renourishment program).170   
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 Essentially, Hurricane Hugo and the damage that it caused allowed the BMA to 
work the way it was designed.  In many places, it was a fresh start under the new law.  
Since houses were now gone, destroyed by the waves and wind, the construction to 
replace the destroyed houses had to comply with the BMA.  This meant that all of a 
sudden numerous property owners were affected by the provisions.  People who 
possessed fully constructed houses before Hugo had little reason to pay attention to the 
setback provisions.  After Hugo, they were directly affected.       
The initial estimate by the Council was that 213 structures that would be affected 
by the reconstruction provisions had been damaged beyond repair.171  Of this group, 
approximately 159 were located in the BMA’s zone of retreat.172  The damaged buildings 
included hotels, motels and single-family beach homes.  Predictably, the response to 
these restrictions by landowners was one of intense opposition.173  There were demands 
to suspend or even repeal the BMA, including a request by Ken Corbett, a legislator from 
the Grand Strand (Myrtle Beach area), for a special session of the General Assembly to 
consider suspension or repeal of the BMA.174  Notably, Corbett won his seat from one of 
sponsors of the BMA.175  The New York Times referred to the opposition to the BMA 
after Hugo as “its most wrenching test of all.”176  
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Though these provisions of the BMA were neither suspended nor repealed at this 
particular time, they, however, were “loosened” by the Council.  Several examples 
illustrate this impression, including the adoption of a 1990 emergency order allowing 
replacement of structures within the twenty-foot zone behind the baseline which were not 
damaged beyond repair, if certain conditions were met.  Essentially, this allowed property 
owners to replace rather than repair buildings that were damaged below the Council’s 
original standard.  While this may have been more cost-effective for some of the property 
owners, it was outside the standard set by the BMA.177 Another highly publicized 
exception was the Council’s decision regarding the Kingfisher Pier seawall.  The Council 
voted to allow reconstruction of this seawall, even though it was damaged beyond fifty 
percent and did not protect a structure.  Critics argued that this decision went directly 
against the intent of the BMA, which was strongly against hard defense of the 
shoreline.178  Another example of the Council’s flexibility during this period was in 
reference to assessments as to the level of damage suffered by a structure.  The Council 
allowed a second damage assessment when requested by the property owner, even though 
a second assessment was not required under the provisions of the BMA.  This had 
dramatic results in some areas, often leading to a reversal of the original permitting 
decision.179 
Timothy Beatley, who has studied this period in coastal zone management 
extensively, characterizes the actions of the Council during this time as a “tendency to be 
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as lenient as possible.”  Beatley attributes this tendency to several factors.  First, this was 
a high level of damage, compounded by the fact that the rules were new.  The regulations 
were not well-known, either to public officials or to coastal residents.  Beatley notes that 
there was “genuine surprise” from coastal residents in regard to the reconstruction 
provisions of the BMA.180     
Property owners, at least in some coastal counties, were further aggravated by 
local zoning provisions.  Counties had the ability to create zoning or other setback 
restrictions as long as they did not conflict with state law.  In Georgetown County, for 
example, there was a twenty-five foot frontyard setback requirement, and few variances 
were given.  Horry County, on the other hand, gave a fifty-percent variance in terms of its 
twenty-foot frontyard setback requirement to homeowners after Hugo to reduce the 
potential burdens of reconstruction.181  As a result, a property owner could face two 
drastically different situations as to reconstruction after Hugo depending on what county 
their property was located. 
 The conclusion that there was a correlation between the extent of damage and the 
amount of setback of the structure is an intuitive one: the farther away a structure is from 
the water, the less damage it tends to have.  Similarly, the idea that wider beaches and 
substantial dunes offered more protection from wind and waves seems obvious.  
Nevertheless, property owners seemed reluctant to make this correlation after Hurricane 
Hugo.  John Singleton, a partial owner of two motels in Myrtle Beach, told The New York 
Times that Coastal Council regulations restricting rebuilding after Hurricane Hugo was 
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equivalent to “someone coming in here and slapping the heck out of your child.”182  
James Kennedy, a property owner in Folly Beach who rebuilt his oceanfront home after 
Hurricane Hugo, “readily acknowledges that Folly’s shifting sand may well be the kind 
of place that should not have been built on.”  However, he “add[s] that he never gave a 
thought to not rebuilding, especially when insurance paid for everything but his $20,000 
seawall.”183 
 The National Research Council, a private, non-profit institution that provides 
scientific, technological and health policy advice under a Congressional charter, 
recommended that no structures whatsoever should be permitted seaward of the ten-year 
erosion line, with the exception of piers and docks.  Additionally, they suggested that 
only readily moveable structures should be permitted seaward of the sixty-year erosion 
line.184  This proposed rule would allow natural processes to continue in the shorefront 
area, maintain a permanent beach and conserve ecological processes and habitats.  On the 
other hand, it would impinge on private property rights and would face a tremendous 
backlash from coastal property owners. 
 
While South Carolina’s initial coastal zone management legislation was a step up 
from nothing, it was insufficient to protect, preserve and restore the beach/dune system of 
the South Carolina coast.  As noted by The State, South Carolina’s daily newspaper based 
in Columbia, “Before 1988, South Carolina had virtually no control over beachfront 
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construction.”185  Its problems, particularly the inadequate power granted to the Coastal 
Council to administer coastal zone policy, were quickly recognized.  The General 
Assembly attempted to respond with changes to the legislation.  They relied heavily on 
the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront Management.  The 
Committee’s suggestions were made with the goal of protecting the beaches of the state 
for the good of the economy of the state.  They did not consider the economics of 
individual coastal property owners.  When the General Assembly wrote the amendments, 
they did not consider these individuals either.  These amendments, passed in 1988, were 
known as the Beachfront Management Act or BMA.   
At first blush, the two most important provisions of the BMA were the rejection 
of erosion control devices and the statement of the “retreat” policy.  These two positions 
were scientifically informed and forward thinking in terms of the preservation of the 
beaches and dunes of the South Carolina coastal zone.  In the long term, these measures 
would improve the natural health of the coastal zone and promote natural processes.  
Nevertheless, these provisions would not be without opponents and detractors.  Two of 
the key factors that would help determine the future of the BMA were the forces of 
Mother Nature and the reactions of coastal property owners.   
As indicated by Cotton Harness, the primary attorney for the Coastal Council 
during this period, the conflict between private property rights and public interest is 
significant on the oceanfront.186  In South Carolina the battle to protect beaches seems to 
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be a catch-22.  The state requires healthy and visually pleasing beaches to attract tourists.  
Before Hurricane Hugo, the tourist industry in South Carolina was second only to 
textiles.  In 1988, tourists spent $4.6 billion in South Carolina, and forty percent of that 
amount was on the Grand Strand alone.187  This need to protect beaches for economic 
reasons is at odds with property rights and the desire of property owners for oceanfront 
development.  While the BMA initially sided with conservationists and those with 
enough foresight to realize that the beaches must be preserved for the economic future of 
South Carolina, it faltered in the face of post-Hugo challenges.  It would be further 
challenged by an individual property owner who, though not affected by the post-Hugo 






















                                                 




 “That the house of every one is to him as his Castle and Fortress…” 
 Sir Edward Coke 
 Semayne’s Case (1604) 
 
 “Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse.” 
 Justice Harry Blackmun 
 Dissenting Opinion, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 
 
While the demand for coastal property has intensified, especially since World 
War II, obviously the supply has not increased.  As a result, conflicts have arisen among 
the many groups who wish to use the land.  One of the most persistent and significant 
conflicts has been how to determine the best balance among economic, environmental, 
public use and aesthetic values to create the most suitable regulation of the coastal zone.  
Dennis Ducsik of the Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management has 
characterized this conflict as “the struggle over sand,” where “the needs for expanded 
recreational opportunities for the public” clash with “the desire for intensive private 
development,” with both activities being “constrained by the existence of powerful 
natural forces as well as fragile ecological systems.”188  As the demand for outdoor 
recreation increased after World War II, so did mobility and extra income.  Tourism, 
particularly in coastal areas, grew rapidly.   
 Frank Goodnow, a turn-of-the-century expert on constitutional and administrative 
law, argued that several of the social problems that were to be found in the United States 
in the early twentieth century that still exist today were the result of the conceptions of 
individual freedom and property rights found in the United States Constitution and these, 
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Goodnow notes, were themselves derived from a consideration of eighteenth-century 
economic conditions.189  Similarly, law professor James Huffman has contended that 
private property have been looked upon as an impediment to environmental regulation for 
two reasons: most environmental problems are not confined to legal boundaries and 
parcels of land, and the Constitution put restraints on governmental actions that involve 
private property.190  This is an apt observation when considering the management of the 
coastal zone, which reaches across state, county and municipal boundaries on the east 
coast. 
 The government sector is not the only active party offering input to coastal zone 
management decisions.  Among the active parties participating in development and land 
use decisions that impact the coastal zone are property owners, developers and builders, 
homeowner associations, neighbors or other residents affected by the use of a particular 
site, lenders and realtors.191  All of these groups tend to look out for their best, and 
usually economic interests.  As a result, many of these groups hamper the passage of 
regulation that would serve to restrict building and development for the purpose of 
conserving the coastal zone.   
 An issue often confronted by regulators, particularly by those wishing to regulate 
the coastal zone, is the question of takings.  Takings are based on the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, which states that private property may not be taken for public use 
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without just compensation.192  “Just compensation” is defined as what a willing buyer 
would pay a willing seller.  There are two basic types of takings: physical occupations 
(such as the use of property to widen a road) and regulatory takings.  Physical takings are 
accomplished through the concept of eminent domain, which is the power of the 
government to seize private property without consent.  Regulatory takings occur when a 
governing body creates a regulation that affects land to a degree that it is as though it has 
been physically taken.  Though the landowner still physically owns the land, he can make 
little or no use of the property under the terms of the regulation.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has defined regulatory takings and crafted rules regarding regulatory takings via a series 
of cases.  Prior to the decision in Lucas, the rules were not particularly clear-cut, and the 
key decisions were separated by several years.   
 In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, decided in 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court found a 
taking had occurred based upon a statute that denied the right to mine coal, even if the 
mining operation might cause the land above the mining operation to collapse.  The Court 
settled on a broad rule regarding governmental regulation and takings.  “The general rule 
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking.”193 (emphasis added)  The Court declined to state a 
“bright line rule” in Pennsylvania Coal, maintaining only that takings questions were 
questions of degree for which “cannot be disposed of by general propositions.”194     
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 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, decided in 1987, the Court ruled that 
the state of California must compensate landowners if it requires them to grant an 
easement for public access to the beach, even if the state’s reasoning is that it is for the 
public good.  Specifically, the Nollans had requested a permit for oceanfront 
construction.  California’s Coastal Commission agreed to grant the permit on the 
condition that the Nollans record an easement on behalf of the public to pass along the 
beach.  The Supreme Court ruled that this was a taking.195 
 According to Timothy Beatley, Professor of Sustainable Communities at the 
University of Virginia, the failure of the legislature to address the takings issue in the 
BMA was perhaps the most significant deficiency of the Act.196  This failure was brought 
to light in 1989, when David Lucas, an aggrieved property owner, filed a lawsuit against 
the Coastal Council, alleging that his inability to place structures on two oceanfront lots 
based on the Beachfront Management Act had resulted in a regulatory taking for which 
he had not received compensation.  The Lucas case was significant for several reasons.  
First, it could impact the constitutionality of the BMA.  (Any of the courts that 
considered the case could have declared the BMA unconstitutional because of potential 
conflict with the U.S. Constitution, thus making the BMA void.)  Even if the 
constitutionality of the law was not affected, it could reflect South Carolina’s monetary 
liability, or lack thereof, under the law.  As noted by The Sun News, many real estate 
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transactions and investments depended upon the outcome of the case.197  The case also 
reflected the discontent of many property owners with the new law.  Lucas was not the 
only one filed in opposition to the BMA.  In fact, when the first ruling was issued in the 
case, several similar suits had been filed, including one by 43 property owners in Horry 
County.198  Finally, it had far-reaching implications for land-use regulations nationally, in 
terms of how it could affect takings law. 
Wild Dunes is located on the Isle of Palms, one of several developed barrier 
islands located near Charleston.  Beginning in the 1970s, the Isle of Palms was subject to 
extensive residential development.  According to Lucas’s own account, he purchased 
Lots 11 and 13 in the Dunesridge West subdivision in 1986 for $475,000 and $485,000 
and planned to build a house for himself on Lot 11 and to build a “spec” house (a house 
that he would then sell) on Lot 13.  According to Lucas, there were only five or six 
undeveloped beachfront lots in Wild Dunes when he purchased these two properties.199   
South Carolina’s barrier islands were classified as “less developed,” in that fewer 
than fifty percent of the state’s barrier islands have been converted to urban uses or other 
built-up uses.200  From the standpoint of development, barrier islands are some of the 
most vulnerable areas of the coastal zone to hurricanes, other storms and the natural 
forces of erosion.  By their nature, they are mobile, not fixed, geological features that 
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grow and shrink in response to storms, changes in sea level and sediment supply.  Barrier 
islands can also be thought of as the first line of defense in terms of hurricanes and other 
storms for the continental coastline.201  They are often the sources of great conflict, since 
they are simultaneously in need of protection while often being dependent on tourism 
economically. 
In this case, the parcels of land immediately adjacent to those purchased by Lucas 
in 1986 already held single-family homes.  When Lucas acquired the lots, they were only 
subject to the weak, original coastal zone management legislation; the more stringent 
provisions did not appear until approximately two years after the purchase of the lots by 
Lucas.  Under the original legislation, Lucas could have built houses on the two lots.  The 
1988 amendments “barred Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his 
parcels.”202  Lucas was one of a small group of property owners who possessed 
undeveloped lots at the time the BMA was passed.  He was not affected by Hugo; he had 
simply chosen not to develop the lots up to that point.   
Under the BMA, land that had been under water in the past forty years could not 
be developed.  As recently as 1963, Lucas’s lots had been entirely underwater, and the 
parcels had been affected by high tides (i.e.-at least partially covered by water when the 
tide was high) as late as 1973.203  As a result, the setback for this area under the 
provisions of the BMA was well landward of the Lucas property.  Structures on these lots 
were likely, from a historical standpoint, to be affected by erosion in the near future.   
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 As Lucas recalled, he planned to begin construction in 1988 and wrote that he 
heard about “pending beachfront legislation in Columbia” around this same time.204  He 
revealed that he was “assured” that the pending legislation had a grandfather clause for 
existing projects that would be applied to his project.205  In Lucas’s account, he wrote that 
the Coastal Council “gutted” the grandfather language and called for a new setback line 
to be drawn “using some pseudoscientific rationale.”206  Lucas acknowledged that the 
Coastal Council line went all the way to behind his lots, taking away “any possible 
economic use.”207  Though he referred to the science and techniques used to draw the 
setback as “pseudoscientific,” photographic evidence showed that the lots had been 
underwater within the twentieth-century. 
Lucas felt that he was being treated unfairly compared to other coastal property 
owners.  He claimed that there only two lots (both his) out of the approximately two 
hundred affected lots in South Carolina that were “entirely taken by this harsh new 
law.”208  (He claimed that others may have been reduced in the amount of buildable area 
but that they were still useable.)  Lucas filed suit against the Coastal Council in the 
Charleston County Court of Common Pleas, under the contention that his inability to 
build on the lots “deprived him of all ‘economically viable use’ of his property and 
therefore effected a ‘taking’ under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that required 
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the payment of just compensation.”209  His arguments were first heard by Judge Larry 
Patterson of the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas. 
The ruling by Judge Patterson came ten days after the case was argued, on August 
10, 1989.  The court found for the Plaintiff in as much as it found the Council’s action to 
be a taking.  The judge found the taking compensable under the U.S. and South Carolina 
Constitutions in the amount of $1,232,387.50.  Lucas would, under this ruling, have to 
deed the lots to the state, and he would receive full compensation.210  While this decision 
did not affect the constitutionality of the BMA, it was taken as an indication that South 
Carolina might be subject to millions of dollars of liability.  Some estimates put the 
amount of potential liability as high as $40 million.211  The ruling pleased many property 
owners, particularly developers and commercial owners.  Joe Garrell, one of 43 Myrtle 
Beach oceanfront homeowners who were part of a pending suit challenging the BMA, 
called the decision “extremely significant.”  Garrell, not coincidentally, owned the Litus 
real estate firm in Myrtle Beach.  He noted, “If the water comes in, we can live with that.  
But for the state to place an arbitrary line out there,…we find that unacceptable.”  But 
environmentalists were not pleased.  Michael Murdoch, president of the state Sierra Club, 
stated, “I think this is a case where the public good has to be looked at…These kind of 
laws are unfortunate, but it’s either that or not having any beach at all…It’s either move 
back or have no beach.”212 
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The Coastal Council appealed the decision to the South Carolina Supreme Court.  
The Court reversed the decision of the trial court, determining “that the 1988 Act sought 
to prevent serious public harm and thus was a permissible restriction on the use of 
Lucas’s property.”213  Therefore, as determined by the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
Lucas had not suffered a regulatory taking that entitled him to compensation.  The South 
Carolina Supreme Court decision came down on February 11, 1991, after almost a year 
of deliberation.  Chief Justice Jean Toal wrote the opinion for a 3-2 majority, reversing 
the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas, stating, in sum, that the Council’s action 
did not amount to a regulatory taking.  The Court reasoned that no compensation was due 
since the proposed use (construction on the lots too near the beach) threatened serious 
public harm.  Toal wrote, “Lucas does not challenge the fact that the legislation here is 
necessary to prevent serious injury to the community, nor does he contend the setback 
requirements affecting him are unreasonable or disproportionate to the goal of preventing 
the specified harms.  In fact, Lucas does not even seek an injunction to prevent 
enforcement of the Act.  Instead, Lucas merely prays for damages and asserts that he is 
entitled to such, regardless of how the proposed use of his property harms the 
public…”214  Chief Justice Toal reflected a clear understanding of the legislative purposes 
behind the BMA with this opinion, which were essentially to protect the beach from 
deterioration caused by unwise decisions by property owners.     
Lucas did not surrender and appealed the decision of the South Carolina Supreme 
Court to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The high court does not have to hear every case for 
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which review is sought.  Of the numerous cases that seek to come before it, the Court 
chooses only a few to consider, usually those that are believed to have widespread 
application.  In this matter, the Court granted the writ of certiorari, and the matter was 
argued before the body on March 2, 1992.215  Over sixty parties filed briefs of amicus 
curiae; approximately sixty percent of the briefs filed urged affirmance of the decision of 
the South Carolina Supreme Court (i.e.-urged that the State be allowed to regulate the 
property in the manner in question without compensation).  The group that urged 
affirmance included over twenty states, including coastal states like Florida and 
California, landlocked states like Iowa and New Mexico (since this ruling could affect 
other environmental regulations), and Great Lakes states (to which the CZMA also 
applied) like Michigan and Wisconsin.216  
The Court first addressed the effect of the 1990 amendments to the BMA on the 
case, which had been passed after the hearing before the South Carolina Supreme Court.  
(These amendments will be discussed in depth in the following chapter.)  The Council 
had suggested that the case was rendered unripe for review via the 1990 amendments.  
The Court held on this matter that the case was not rendered unripe by these changes to 
the law, which may have allowed Lucas to secure a special permit to build on his 
property.  The Court determined that it would be unfair to insist that Lucas pursue this 
procedure as an precursor to considering the case ripe for review.217   
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The Court noted that under the 1977 legislation, the two subject lots were not in a 
“critical area.”  As such, Lucas would not have been required to obtain a permit from the 
Coastal Council under this legislation, which was the controlling legislation at the time he 
purchased the lots.218  As further noted by the Court, this situation changed dramatically 
after the application of the 1988 amendments, in that the two lots were seaward of the 
baseline established by the Council.  Therefore, no construction of habitable structures 
was permitted.219  The Court then examined the primary issue of the case, the question of 
whether or not a regulatory taking had been effected upon the two lots.  They cited 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon for the proposition that regulatory takings, as opposed to 
direct appropriations of property, are compensable, further acknowledging the 
Pennsylvania Coal provided little guidance on when a given regulation could be 
considered a taking.220  The Court concluded that three basic principles would apply to 
this case and would thereby become law. 
First, the Court determined that a taking has occurred in a situation where “the 
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses 
in the name of the common good.”221  The Court’s opinion in this regard, termed 
“narrow” by some commentators, only applies when a property owner is deprived of all 
economic value (as opposed to a reduction in value.)222  Therefore, this ruling would not 
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apply to other landowners whose lots were effectively decreased in size under the BMA, 
as long as they still had some economic use as to the property.  Second, the Court held 
that the determination of the South Carolina Supreme Court that this case should be 
decided by whether or not the proposed action caused serious public harm was 
inappropriate.223  As a result, the Court concluded, the only way that this matter would 
not be a taking is if Lucas never had the rights in question under state common law.  In 
other words, if Lucas did not acquire the right to place structures on these two lots when 
he obtained title to the property, then it was not a regulatory taking for the Council to 
deny him this use.224 
While the Court found it “unlikely that common-law principles would have 
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvement” on the lots, it held 
that the issue was one of state law.225  While reversing the ruling of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court, the third and final holding of the high court was to remand the case to the 
South Carolina Supreme Court for adjudication of the common law issue.  The Court 
emphasized, however, that to win the case the Council must “identify background 
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he [Lucas] now intends in 
the circumstances in which the property is presently found.”226  The majority opinion, 
written by Justice Antonin Scalia, was joined in by six of the Justices.  (The decision was 
a 6-3 split decision; Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Byron White, Sandra 
Day O’Connor and Clarence Thomas joined in the majority opinion.)  Justice Anthony 
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Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, while Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul 
Stevens filed separate dissenting opinions.  Justice David Souter filed a separate 
statement.227  (Justice Souter’s statement was based on the opinion that the Court should 
not have granted the writ of certiorari as an initial matter.)228   
Justice Blackmun’s dissent was particularly forceful, and in it he questioned not 
only the decision to review the case but also the principles upon which the decision was 
made.  He noted that the lots in question, and in fact the entire area around them, was 
“notoriously unstable,” and, further, that “in roughly half of the last forty years, all or part 
of petitioner’s property was part of the beach or flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow 
of the tide.”229  Justice Blackmun was particularly disturbed that the Court overturned 
years of precedent that assumed that “the State has full power to prohibit an owner’s use 
of property if it is harmful to the public.”230  Blackmun concluded that the Court’s ruling 
makes “sweeping,” “misguided,” and “unsupported changes in our takings doctrine.”  
Justice Stevens disagreed both with the hearing of the case and with its reasoning.  He 
argued that the case should not have been heard until Lucas had exhausted his 
administrative remedies (by applying for a permit under the newer BMA provisions).  
Additionally, he disagreed with the Court’s expansion of the takings principle, which he 
termed “illogical.”231 
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of damages based on a temporary 
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taking.  The state court was not persuaded by the arguments of the Coastal Council “that 
any common law basis exists by which it could restrain Lucas’s desired use of his 
land.”232  Nor, the Court noted further, had their own research indicated any such 
common law principle.  As a result, the Court directed the trial judge to make specific 
findings of damages to compensate Lucas for his temporary taking.  (The taking was only 
deemed “temporary” as Lucas was now able to file for a special permit under the new 
BMA amendments.)233 
Finally, in July 1993, the struggle ended.  Lucas received $1,575,000, to be paid 
to him by the State of South Carolina.  He received less than $10,000 after paying off the 
mortgages on the lots and his attorneys’ fees.234  The famous case was resolved in whole 
in November 1993 when, according to Lucas’s account, the lots were sold via auction by 
the state to a developer for $730,000.235  (The lots were now potentially developable by 
consent of special permit as per the amendments passed after Hugo and the first Lucas 
decision.)  The state was criticized for the decision, even by legislators.  Senator Larry 
Richter, a Republican from Charleston, stated, “The state certainly looks pretty silly.  It’s 
the sort of stuff the public is ticked off about.”236 
 
The decisions in Lucas have had two primary impacts upon coastal zone 
management policy and legislation in South Carolina.  First, the Lucas decision was 
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significant because it brought to light the potential financial liability of the state as to 
prohibitions on building in the coastal zone.  Second, the decision of the Charleston 
County Court of Common Pleas (the initial victory for Lucas as plaintiff), issued in 
August 1989, served as a buttress for property owners who were dissatisfied with the 
provisions of the BMA following Hurricane Hugo.  As a result, this decision was one of 
the key factors in the writing and passage of the 1990 amendments to the BMA.237  These 
amendments would move South Carolina into an era of weaker coastal zone management 
policy and regulation.  The Lucas case was an example of the type of property owner 
protest that occurred in response to BMA.  Citizens viewed the BMA as a restraint on 
their private property rights, which they viewed as guaranteed by the Constitution.  
Property owners valued the environmental protection of the BMA less than they valued 
their property rights.   
In a larger sense, Lucas’s plight had an impact outside of South Carolina.  
According to Susan Murray, a policy analyst for the National Audubon Society, “David 
Lucas has had an impact on the entire country.”  Murray remarked that Lucas, who she 
called a “sympathetic person,” had more appeal to the general public than run-of-the-mill 
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lobbyists.  After the resolution of the case, Lucas formed the Council on Private Property, 
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“The countryside is the most intense battleground of all in the environmental-
developmental contest, and it is at the state level – in the General Assemblies, the 
administrative agencies, and the hearing boards and courts that these 
controversies can be best identified.” 
 --Samuel P. Hays 
 A History of Environmental Politics Since 1945 
 
As public policy professor Cary Coglianese has noted, “Just as environmental law 
came into existence due to politics, so too can it be changed due to politics.”239  This idea 
is certainly applicable to coastal zone management legislation in South Carolina.  In 
summer 1990, following Hurricane Hugo and the backlash to the 1988 amendments, as 
well as in the wake of the trial court’s decision in Lucas (issued in August 1989), the 
General Assembly wrote revisions to South Carolina’s coastal zone management law.  
These alterations have been referred to as “a political retreat from retreat.”240  Like all 
elected bodies, members of the South Carolina General Assembly are subject to pressures 
from their constituents.  In this case, many coastal citizens were angered by the 
provisions of the BMA, which fully came to light after the damage wrought by Hurricane 
Hugo.  As a result, a number of legislators from coastal counties sought to weaken the 
BMA through amendment.     
The amendments were introduced by Jim Waddell, a Democratic Senator from 
Beaufort (a coastal county located between Charleston and the Georgia border).  In 
formulating the 1989 amendments, Waddell worked with the South Carolina Tourism 
Council, a group comprised largely of bankers and developers.  Ironically, Waddell was a 
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former member of the Coastal Council who supported the BMA when it was passed.  He 
acknowledged that he lost votes in the November 1988 election due to his support of the 
BMA; this is likely the reason that he changed his position on the strength of the law.241  
Like Waddell, Senator Bud Long of Horry County (a coastal county that includes Myrtle 
Beach) pushed for changes that weakened the law.  Long fought for more permissive 
seawall standards and fewer restrictions on coastal construction.242 
Many developers and property owners protested the BMA “from the day it 
became law” as being too restrictive toward construction.243  Austin Beveridge of Fripp 
Island decried the passage of the BMA in a letter to the editor of The State.  He wrote, 
“Nobody is going to invest along the beachfront in South Carolina.  Everybody in South 
Carolina stands to lose from this misguided Beachfront Management Act.”244  Developers 
and commercial landowners were pleased with the changes to the law.  Doug Martin, 
president of the Myrtle Beach Area Hotel and Motel Association, was encouraged by the 
changes.  “For developed areas of the beach,” he said, “there’s no question the [original 
BMA] lessened the value of property.  If you can’t put a building on a piece of property 
and protect it with a seawall, that obviously lessens the value.”245  The Sun News, the 
daily paper for the greater Myrtle Beach area, supported the revisions.  An editorial 
printed therein supported the amendments because of their treatment of seawalls, though 
it warned citizens that developers “have often found ways to challenge such laws.”  The 
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newspaper was critical of the elimination of the dead zone but supported provisions that 
continued renourishment.246  
Despite these criticisms, some positive aspects of the original version of the BMA 
remained in force.  The revised BMA did maintain the forty-year erosion line and the size 
restrictions (5000 square feet) on structures that were added to the law in 1988.247  
Constraints on hard erosion control devices were actually increased; once seawalls are 
damaged beyond a certain extent (which changes via a stated timeline), they could not be 
rebuilt.248  As previously discussed, this move away from hard erosion-control devices 
was crucial, both in terms of maintaining natural processes and conserving “downstream” 
beaches that often erode more severely due to the effects of seawalls placed to protect 
structures behind neighboring beaches.  With the vocal exception of developers and 
commercial property owners, most citizens seemed to support the move away from 
erosion-control devices.  An editorial in The Sun News stated, “Seawalls exacerbate 
scouring by the ocean, reducing the sand available on the recreational beach.”  The 
editorial also stated that eliminating the anti-seawall provision would be “kowtowing to 
the developers.”249       
There were, however, other major changes, as the “retreat from retreat” comment 
implies.  The new BMA considerably weakened the setback provisions that had 
responded to the concerns of the Blue Ribbon Committee.  The twenty-foot no 
construction zone was eliminated entirely.  Construction seaward of the baseline, 
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although technically not allowed, was designated as tolerable, via eight listed, allowable 
exceptions.250  Additionally, the new BMA created a procedure that allowed the Council 
to issue permits for construction seaward of the baseline if certain conditions were met, 
including that the owner must be willing to remove the structure if ordered to do so by 
the Council.251  (This was the special permitting procedure considered by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Lucas.)  Overall, it is impossible to view these amendments in any way 
except as a deterioration of the 1988 version of the BMA. 
Despite the indication that coastal voters were not behind the BMA, there were 
some outspoken coastal citizens who supported the stronger provisions.  Constance 
Angeletti, a Hilton Head resident, applauded the BMA.  She wrote, “Without a setback 
line, developers will continue to build close to the beach.”252  She later complained to The 
State that “the ‘greedy profiteers’ will continue to rape our beaches and pollute the 
estuaries, marshes and the environment in general to the detriment of all South 
Carolinians.”  The amendments to the BMA, she wrote, “will make the aftermath of the 
Civil War pale into insignificance by comparison.”253     
Furthermore, a 1989 South Carolina poll conducted by Metromark Market 
Research for The State indicated that voters were concerned about beachfront 
development.  A third of those polled were in favor of leaving the BMA intact, and an 
additional third were in favoring of strengthened to set even greater limits on beachfront 
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construction.  According to the poll, which consisted of 508 registered voters, only about 
eighteen percent favored weakening the BMA.254 
The work of Coastal Council has been judged in a positive light.  Environmental 
groups have praised the agency, and it has been viewed by many as the driving force 
behind the 1988 amendments.255  In 1992, the South Carolina Coastal Council won the 
Excellence in Coastal Zone Management award given by the NOAA.256  A year later, 
South Carolina had received $21,704,612 in matching grants from the Office of Oceans 
and Coastal Resources Management for the administration of its coastal program.257  
Large portions of this money were used for general administration of the state’s program, 
but a great deal of it was used for renourishment projects.  Despite these positive 
indications, the Coastal Council did not continue as the administrative agency responsible 
for the legislation.  South Carolina’s coastal zone management legislation was amended 
again in 1993.  As part of these amendments, the Coastal Council ceased to be an 
independent agency and was absorbed as a division of the South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control.  It was renamed the Office of Ocean and Coastal 
Resource Management (OCRM).258  The next year, former members of the South 
Carolina Coastal Council became members of the South Carolina Coastal Zone Appellate 
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Panel, which was designated to “act as an advisory council” to DHEC.  DHEC was given 
the Council’s original mandate to administer the state’s coastal zone management 
program, including the power to approve or deny permits for construction and 
development.259  Essentially, this meant that DHEC would have the final decision as the 
permitting and other regulatory decisions.  The DHEC Commissioner was now the final 
decision-maker as opposed to the chair of the Coastal Council.  Wayne Beam, a Chester, 
South Carolina, native with a doctorate in environmental sciences and part of the Coastal 
Council since its inception, was critical of the decision and observed, “We have gone out 
and written legislation.  When we talk about being independent, I’m talking about going 
up against the Highway Department and the Department of Commerce.  The forces that 
control DHEC won’t do that.”260  
During its tenure as the administrative body of South Carolina’s coastal zone 
management program, OCRM seems to have erred on the side of private landowners.  In 
2001, the South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the South Carolina Coastal 
Conservation League and the Sierra Club, organizations that protested DHEC’s decision 
to issue a permit for the refurbishment of a groin field and the construction of new groins 
along the beach on Hilton Head Island.  Such an act had been prohibited by the BMA.261  
(Groins are a type of hard shoreline defense.)  The Court noted that BMA showed a clear 
                                                 
259 S.C. Code 48-39-40 and 48-39-50. 
260 Brett Bursey, “The Incredible Shrinking Coastal Agency,” South Carolina Progressive Network, 
www.scpronet.com/point/9609/p07.html. 
261 South Carolina Coastal Conservation League and Sierra Club v. South Carolina Department of Health 
and Environmental Control, Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management; Port Royal Plantation; 
and Town of Hilton Head, 548 S.E.2d 887 (2001). 
 97
legislative choice against armoring of the shoreline.  Additionally, the Court cited that 
portion of the BMA which denies construction seaward of the baseline.262 
DHEC’s argument was that the BMA did not specifically include groins in its list 
of erosion control devices.  (While this is technically the case, the statute does not 
attempt to give an exhaustive list of all erosion control devices.  It only states that erosion 
control devices “include” seawalls, bulkheads and revetments.)263  The Court held as a 
matter of law that the BMA prohibited the issuance of permits for the construction or 
reconstruction of new or existing groins.264  This case is significant for several reasons.  
DHEC was clearly erring on the side of the private property owners in making this 
decision.  Hilton Head Island is an exclusive area with extremely high property values.  
As such, it is clear why property owners there wanted to construct shore armoring 
devices.  However, the BMA is clear in its intent to end construction of erosion-control 
devices.  By issuing this decision, DHEC seems to be indicating a preference contrary to 
the goal of the legislature.  
Despite the state’s movement away from strong regulation, some South Carolina 
communities have instituted stronger control of development.  Spring Island, South 
Carolina, located south of Charleston near Beaufort, is an example of development based 
on strict environmental standards.  Changes to the BMA altered nothing about Spring 
Island, which has self-imposed setback restrictions more stringent than those included in 
the 1988 form of the BMA.  The owners and developers of Spring Island, James Chaffin 
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and James Light, purchased the island in 1989 for $17 million.  The Spring Island 
developers transplant trees rather than cutting them down and offer no paved roads.  A 
third of the 3,500 acre island has been set aside as a nature preserve.  Chaffin and Light 
were approved for 5,500 units of development but chose to only have 500 units.  Instead 
of the three possible golf courses for which they were approved, they chose to build only 
one, which would follow the contours of existing corn fields.265 
      Another example of a community committed to “protecting and nurturing the 
ecosystem” is Dewees Island, located eleven miles north of Charleston.266  Like Spring 
Island, Dewees Island has many restrictions designed to respect the land, water and 
wildlife.  The only vehicles allowed on the island are golf carts, yet even they are not 
allowed on the beach.  Recycling is mandatory, as is community service with the 
environmental staff of the island.  Construction on the island is limited to 150 units, by 
agreement between the owners of the island and South Carolina.  Activities that may 
harm “drainage, flood control, water conservation, erosion control or soil conservation, or 
fish and wildlife habitat preservation” are strictly prohibited.267 
 While developments and communities like Spring Island and Dewees Island 
should succeed from the standpoint of conservation, they are unavailable to the majority 
of South Carolina residents because of their cost.  Lots and homes on the islands are 
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expensive, putting them out of the price range of the majority.268  Nevertheless, these 
progressive regulations are available to other communities, should they choose to 
implement and enforce them.  The National Research Council has argued that “a single 
uniform national ‘answer’ to erosion problems is neither practical nor desirable.”  
Further, the National Research Council has asserted that specific, localized conditions 
should determine rules for setbacks, relocation of endangered structures, beach 
nourishment and shoreline armoring.269  Locally enacted regulations may be the best 
system for protecting coastal resources, but up to this point, they have only been used by 
upscale communities.  
 Another possibility for conservation in the coastal zone is through the concept of 
sustainability.  Sustainable use, or sustainability, of the coastal zone is defined as the 
planning and management of economic development of the coastal zone so as to achieve 
a balanced, maximum, and resource-constrained flow of benefits which is economically 
and environmentally sustainable.  This movement has also been known as wise use or 
conservation.270  This idea is already being explored through the Center for Sustainable 
Living, a public-private-academic partnership located in Charleston.  (The Center has 
several public “partners,” including the South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium, Clemson 
University Extension Service, City of Charleston, Charleston County and Federal 
Management Agency.  It is also supported by about fifty private donors, which include 
individuals and businesses.  A full list of partners and donors can be found on the 
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Center’s website.)  It was designed “to conduct education programs to help minimize 
threats from natural disasters and to enhance resource conservation.”  The Center 
develops techniques and offers assistance programs in the areas of natural hazards 
mitigation, sustainable building practices and sustainable living.271  Policies like those 
explored at the Center for Sustainable Living and regulations like those in place on 
Spring Island and Dewees Island are necessary for consideration since current policies 
and regulations are falling short in terms of protecting the coastal zone.  
 On the whole, it seems that South Carolina’s journey into coastal regulation began 
positively (when it created regulation where none existed).  It continued to improve with 
the passage of the BMA.  Hugo and Lucas, however, revealed opposition to the BMA 
that resulted in amendments.  This was backtracking from the point-of-view of coastal 
protection.  These changes were possible due to the nature of the CZMA.  Because of the 
flexibility of the CZMA, there was no “natural” way for coastal statutes to evolve.  The 
CZMA was designed to be discretionary so that individual states were able to decide on 
the best policy for their geography, economy and political situation.   
A comparison between the North Carolina and South Carolina programs is useful 
to demonstrate the unrestricted and flexible nature of the CZMA as well as to reveal the 
distinctive qualities of South Carolina’s program and how the South Carolina program 
evolved.  The character and structure of coastal zone management programs under the 
CZMA varied widely from state to state.  Some states, including the Carolinas, passed 
comprehensive legislation as a framework for their programs.  Others opted to use 
                                                 
271 “113 Calhoun St.: A Center for Sustainable Living,” A Center for Sustainable Living, 
www.113calhoun.org.  
 101
existing land-use regulations as the foundation for their program or to link existing 
single-purpose laws into a comprehensive umbrella for coastal zone management.  In the 
1970s, South Carolina’s geographical neighbor, North Carolina, also implemented a 
coastal management program under the CZMA.272  Although politically and 
economically relatively similar to South Carolina, North Carolina’s coastal zone is 
different.  It is much more dominated by highly dynamic barrier islands.  Additionally, 
North Carolina beaches are more prone to erosion.  As a result, the coastal management 
plan is also different in several respects.  
 North Carolina’s coastline is almost 320 miles in length and includes 23 separate 
islands, including the Outer Banks area, that are extremely dynamic.  The state has been 
hit by more storms that either South Carolina or Georgia, including more major 
hurricanes.  North Carolina is also more prone to winter storms, which may also cause 
severe damage and increase shoreline erosion.  Fortunately, almost half of North 
Carolina’s ocean coasts are publicly owned, with the two most significant holdings being 
the Cape Hatteras and Cape Lookout National Seashores.  Together these two federal 
holdings constitute 127 miles of ocean frontage.273  Another feature that makes North 
Carolina different involves waves.  Experts classify those striking the North Carolina 
shoreline as “energetic,” meaning that they move a great deal of sand.  On the Outer 
Banks of North Carolina, it has been estimated that as much as seven hundred thousand 
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cubic yards of sand annually may move from north to south along a stretch of beach.  
This is as much as seventy thousand medium-sized dump trucks.274  (South Carolina’s 
coastline is transitional between the wave-dominated coast of North Carolina and the 
tide-dominated coast of Georgia.  South Carolina is generally less susceptible to dramatic 
erosion trends than North Carolina.)275   
North Carolina submitted its coastal zone management proposal for approval 
fairly quickly.  Its Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) was passed by the North 
Carolina legislature in 1974.  CAMA involved “the most intense debate of any 
environmental bill in the state’s history.”276  In September 1978 CAMA received federal 
approval.277  It defines its coastal zone to include any county that either borders on the 
Atlantic Ocean or any body of water containing salt water.  (As aforementioned, each 
state can designate its coastal zone, and thus the area subject to regulation under its 
program, as it sees fit.  Some states, Florida and Delaware for example, have designated 
their entire state as a coastal zone.)  CAMA has both a regulatory prong and a planning 
prong.  Both parts receive policy direction through the Coastal Resources Commission 
(CRC), a group of fifteen citizens appointed by the governor.  The CRC is advised by the 
Coastal Resources Advisory Council (CRAC), a group of forty-seven local government 
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representatives.  Under the planning unit, local land use plans must be adopted.  If a 
locality fails to adopt a plan, the CRC will write one for that locality.278 
Similarly, South Carolina adopted local beach management plans as part of its 
post-Hugo amendments.  The South Carolina provisions required that local governments 
must prepare, by July 1, 1991, a “local comprehensive beach management plan.”  These 
documents were required to incorporate, at a minimum, ten stated elements, including 
analysis of erosion control devices, an inventory of structures located seaward of the 
setback line and “a detailed strategy for achieving the goals of preservation of existing 
public access and the enhancement of public access to assure full enjoyment of the beach 
by all residents of this State.”279  The regulatory program only comes into play for what 
South Carolina early on termed critical areas—those designated by the CRC as areas of 
environmental concern.  All development in these areas is subject to the CRC’s permit 
standards, which are administered at the state level if deemed “major” or at the local level 
if deemed “minor.”  Development is considered “major” if it would require another state 
or federal permit, if it involves more than twenty acres of land disturbance or if it will be 
larger than 60,000 square feet.280  The CRC hears appeals from both types of permitting 
decisions.281    Like South Carolina, the CRC also banned shore-hardening devices.282 
In June 1979, North Carolina adopted its setback provisions.  Under these 
regulations, development in areas of environmental concern must be located at a 
minimum, the furthest landward of four designated points: “1) a distance 30 times the 
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long-term annual erosion rate, measured from the vegetation line; 2) behind the crest of 
the ‘primary’ dune (defined as the first dune with an elevation equal to the 100 year storm 
level plus six feet); 3) behind the landward toe of the ‘frontal’ dune (defined as the first 
dune with sufficient height, vegetation, continuity and configuration to offer protective 
value; or 4) 60 feet landward of the vegetation line.”283  
After the adoption of these setback provisions, it was estimated by the CRC that 
approximately 800 oceanfront lots would be undevelopable.  Two exceptions were 
adopted soon thereafter.  These measures allowed insubstantial structures (such as 
parking areas, campgrounds and small gazebos) between the vegetation and setback lines, 
provided there is no dune alteration, and permitted an exemption to the erosion rate 
setback for lots that existed prior to June 1, 1979, if several extensive requirements were 
met.284  This is an important distinction when compared to South Carolina’s 1988 version 
of the BMA.  The BMA appeared to be harsher, in that it allowed no structures.  
Nevertheless, an estimated 500 lots were still left undevelopable under the North 
Carolina regulations.285 
As part of its coastal zone management program, North Carolina stressed 
education and policy development.  Some coastal zone management scholars have argued 
the successful coastal management programs require public education to gain broad 
support for and participation in the program.286  North Carolina’s educational program 
has focused on coastal hazards and sound development practices and was directed toward 
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realtors, developers, bankers, planners and elected officials.287  These initiatives were in 
line with 1990 recommendations of the National Research Council, which argued that “a 
more informed or educated public (including buyers, sellers, developers, planners, 
engineers, and public officials) would be able to make better long-term coastal 
development decisions.”288 
 
In 1990, South Carolina amended its coastal zone management legislation in the 
wake of two events:  Hurricane Hugo and the trial court decision in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council.  The events following Hugo were significant because they 
indicated an extreme level of dissatisfaction with the 1988 version of the BMA, at least in 
terms of vocal coastal property owners.  The decision of the trial court in Lucas, which 
had awarded significant monetary damages to the property owner, seemed to indicate that 
South Carolina would be in several expensive lawsuits if the BMA were not modified.  
The 1990 amendments, while maintaining the general policy of retreat and 
reinforcing the commitment to move away from hard erosion control, weakened the 
state’s regulatory power and its coastal zone management policy.  In the face of the 1989 
opposition, the General Assembly chose to ignore, at least in part, recommendations 
given to it only a few years earlier by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront 
Management.  Now, property owners would be able to build in areas that had only 
recently been covered by water and that could be again, by meeting only a few 
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requirements.  In its third attempt to sort out its policy, the General Assembly had 
backtracked. 
In 1993, the General Assembly continued to tinker with coastal zone management 
legislation, this time changing the administration of the policy.  The Coastal Council, 
which had been the agency responsible for the state’s coastal zone management policy 
since its initial implementation, was absorbed by DHEC.  This administrative body 
became merely a division in a larger state agency; it did not even have final decision-
making authority.  This change indicated a move toward the interests of property owners.  
South Carolina’s first three attempts at coastal regulation were not a natural 
evolution of policy.  They were based on a series of choices made by legislators.  A 
comparison to North Carolina’s policy illustrates this conclusion.  In several ways, South 
Carolina’s program is similar to North Carolina’s.  First, both have experienced periods 
of contentiousness, though North Carolina’s battles primarily occurred during the initial 
legislative process.  As initially enacted, both launched a new agency for the 
administration of their programs.  Both states made the decision to move away from, and 
eventually ban, hard coastal defenses, and each passed provisions that sought dune 
protection.  Finally, both coastal zone management policies center on permits and 
permitting decisions as the primary vehicle for controlling unwise siting and 
development.   
More significant are the differences between the two programs.  North Carolina’s 
administrative agency can regulate a much broader area, due to how it defined its coastal 
zone.  Whereas North Carolina focused on the type of activity when considering whether 
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or not a permit will be issued, South Carolina focused more on where the development 
will occur, i.e.—what type of environment will be affected/effect on critical areas.  The 
implication in this comparison, therefore, is that South Carolina’s primary concern was in 
limiting construction and development in certain areas, particularly those in close 
proximity to the beach and its associated erosion zones.  This conclusion made the 1990 
amendments to the BMA much more difficult to grasp, as they seemed to undermine the 
entire thrust of the state’s policy.  It does, however, further illuminate the difficulty of 
writing and implementing environmental regulations that are amenable to citizens.  In 
this case, significant portions of the population (coastal property owners generally) and 
vocal portions of the population (developers and commercial property owners) were 
unhappy with how their property was regulated.  As a result, the regulation was revised.  
While this change was probably not the best thing for the coast as a whole, or even for 
the property owners in the long term, it satisfied most of the constituents for the short 
term.   










“In the final analysis, the long-range public good is the same as the long-range 
private good.  If the dry sand beaches of this State disappear because of the failure 
of its people and governmental natural resource managers to protect the 
beach/dune system, future generations will never have the opportunity to use and 
enjoy this valuable resource.” 
 --South Carolina Coastal Council 
 Regulations for Permitting in Critical Areas of the State’s Coastal Zone  
 (May 1991) 
 
 
 As regulatory historian Thomas McCraw has noted, “almost nobody ever declares 
his hostility to the ‘public interest.’”289  Still, as Samuel Hays, environmental historian, 
has argued, many groups became increasingly frustrated and antagonistic toward what 
they considered to be “environmental roadblocks to their goals and objectives.”290  This is 
the crux of the coastal zone management conflict of interest: everyone, in theory, wants 
to protect the coastal zone and its resources, yet most private property owners want to be 
free to develop their property as they see fit with no input from the government and no 
restrictions through regulations.  The coastal zone has much to offer, in terms of 
aesthetics, recreation, scientific research and observation and potential economic benefits.  
Because there are so many competing interests that desire to use and benefit from the 
coastal zone, conflicts have been associated with its regulation.  In South Carolina, the 
number of people who live in the coastal zone, in addition to the amount of money that 
depends on coastal tourism, has exacerbated this discord.   
While the coastal zone management regulation went the way of environmental 
regulation generally in its formative years, it has proved, in some ways, more enduring 
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than other varieties of regulation.  In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration spent 
considerable effort to curb environmental regulation.  As Hays has observed, though, the 
CZMA proved somewhat more difficult to modify than some other statutes.291  This is 
likely because, as the initial Senate support for the law indicated, money given to the 
states is hard to take away.  The CZMA remains a part of the governing legislation that 
affects the coastal zone in the twenty-first century and has changed little.  In the United 
States, both public and private sectors influence the formation of coastal zone policy.  
Additionally, all three levels of government, federal, state and local, are involved in 
writing and administering coastal zone management policies.  The CZMA is the most 
prominent federal statute affecting the coastal zone, though there are several others that 
impact it.  Though enacted during the early 1970s with many other federal environmental 
statutes, the CZMA is different in that state participation is completely voluntary.  Local 
regulation usually comes in the form of zoning ordinances or subdivision regulations.292    
The private sector can play a strong role in determining the character of regulation that is 
passed in relation to the coastal zone and in terms of the environment generally.  This can 
be a good thing and has created stronger environmental legislation in some cases.  An 
example of this public participation can be seen in the mass passage of environmental 
regulation in the early 1970s.  Alternatively, the public can emphasize other rights that 
conflict with environmental mandates, in turn weakening environmental laws.  This is 
one of the factors that worked to dilute South Carolina’s coastal zone management 
legislation in the early 1990s. 
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 The flexibility of the CZMA was one of its biggest assets and one of its biggest 
downfalls.  While it permitted states and localities to design plans that best fit their 
ecological and economic conditions, it also allowed for inadequate, even deficient, 
regulations since only base requirements need be met.  As marine scientists John and 
Winona Vernberg have noted, “the most rigorous requirement that a state must meet is 
that its program strikes a balance between development and the environment.”293  Each 
state decided how much or how little it wants to regulate its coastal resources.  In the case 
of South Carolina, a once strong management program was weakened with no federal 
ramifications. 
 According to the writings of geologists Roger Charlier and Christian DeMeyer, 
the principal objectives of coastal management are to avoid development in areas 
susceptible to flooding, to ensure that natural systems continue to operate, and to protect 
human lives, property and economic activities.  As a result, these authors contend, a 
successful program should give “full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic and 
aesthetic values and to the needs for human safety and economic development.”294  As a 
review of South Carolina’s policy has indicated, this is a difficult balance to achieve, 
especially considering that safety and ecology are often at odds with development and 
economics. 
 The Beachfront Management Act was a response to a growing threat to a $3 
billion industry in South Carolina—tourism.  If beaches disappeared or became 
drastically degraded in terms of quality and/or accessibility, the state’s profitable tourism 
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industry would suffer an enormous loss.  Therefore, the program was refitted around the 
concepts of retreat (via the setback provisions) and elimination of erosion control 
structures.  This legislation was aggressive and proactive, and it reflected modern 
scientific principles and ideas.  As sustainability professor Timothy Beatley has noted, 
the 1988 revisions “represented a major and significant expansion of the state’s control 
over coastal development.”295  These amendments were necessary since, as Justice Harry 
Blackmun noted in his dissenting opinion in Lucas, “the 1977 critical area was relatively 
narrow.”296  It did not, however, take into account the naïveté of coastal property owners 
in terms of governmental regulation, nor did it consider the financial implications for 
these citizens. 
 One of the key aspects of the BMA was to move away from hard defenses of the 
shoreline and toward soft defenses, especially beach renourishment.  While definitely 
preferable to erosion control devices such as seawalls, renourishment is also not a perfect 
solution.  Renourished beaches do not have a good record of longevity.297  
Renourishment is, in short, always a work in progress.  After Hurricane Hugo, for 
example, South Carolina spent approximately $6.6 million in renourishment projects on a 
forty-five mile strip of beaches.  Two years before Hugo, Myrtle Beach spent $5 million 
renourishing its beach; one third of the 53,000 truckloads of sand brought in by Myrtle 
Beach in that effort disappeared after Hugo.298  This is an indication of one of the 
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problems with coastal zone management: even the best available solutions are not 
perfect.   
One of the positive features of South Carolina’s coastal zone management policy 
was protection of dunes.  South Carolina addressed this matter from the beginning in its 
coastal zone management planning.  The “dune system” was recognized as part of the 
legislatively defined “critical area.”299  As a result, it was protected from any utilization 
without a permit.300  Additionally, the destruction of dune vegetation seaward of the 
setback line was prohibited unless there was no feasible alternative; when that was 
determined to be the case, new vegetation was required to be planted wherever 
possible.301  Dunes are an invaluable element in protecting property that lies behind the 
beach.  During Hurricane Hugo, for example, Litchfield-by-the-Sea (a private 
condominium community located between Murrell’s Inlet and Mt. Pleasant) was 
protected by artificial dunes that were twenty feet tall and more than eighty feet wide.  
Structures behind the dunes received only modest damage, though one and half dunes 
were washed away.302 
When South Carolina’s setback provisions were created, they were designed with 
flexibility to accord with the variable nature of the South Carolina’s shoreline.  Because 
some beaches were accreting while others were rapidly eroding, the standard had to be a 
dynamic one so that all the beaches could be appropriately accommodated and so that 
development could proceed where possible.  The setback line was tied to local conditions 
                                                 
299 S.C. Code 48-39-10(J) 
300 S.C. Code 48-39-130 
301 S.C. Code 48-39-310. 
302 “South Carolina Begins Rebuilding Storm-Swept Beach Dunes,” The New York Times, October 5, 1989. 
 113
and the local erosion rate, thereby accounting for the natural variation in shoreline trends 
among beaches.303 
As has been noted by coastal zone management authorities, coastal erosion, while 
a natural process that is the result of many complex interactions within nature, is 
furthered by the actions of man.304  Although winds, tides, changes in sea-level and 
hurricanes affect the rate and nature of coastal erosion, so too do construction of hard 
defenses, improvement of inlets, dredging for sand and construction of other structures 
near the shoreline and dune systems.  There would be no “erosion problem” without 
human development.  Erosion is a natural, ongoing process of the coastal zone.  It has 
only become problematic because human beings have built structures too close to the 
shoreline.305  That being said, it is unlikely that people will end beachfront construction, 
even if it is obviously unwise.  Therefore, policies for coastal development should guide 
development so that it can be as prudent as possible considering the hazards of 
development in this area as well as the sensitivity of the area.  While ending coastal 
erosion and shoreline retreat is generally acknowledged to be impossible (except, 
perhaps, by owners of property adjacent to the shoreline), coastal planners have strived to 
restore areas in danger and reduce the rate of erosion.306   
Coastal storms, and especially hurricanes in the case of South Carolina, have had 
dramatic effects on the shoreline and coastal zone as a whole.  Hurricanes have affected 
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the shape of the shoreline, size of dunes and rate of erosion.  Extremely accelerated rates 
of erosion have occurred during hurricanes.  Additionally, shoreline and other coastal 
zone development have been damaged or completely destroyed if struck by a hurricane, 
depending largely on their location in relation to the shoreline.  One of the primary 
factors associated with hurricane damage is storm surge, which can combine with high 




Damage in the United States Resulting from Hurricanes 
  
Decade Damage 
In Billions of  1990 Dollars 
1900-1910 Less than 1 billion 
1911-1920 Less than 1 billion 
1921-1930 1.5 billion 
1931-1940 4.5 billion 
1941-1950 4.5 billion 
1951-1960 11 billion 
1961-1970 17 billion 
1971-1980 18 billion 
1981-1990 15 billion 
 
 Before the Hugo and Lucas-driven changes, South Carolina’s coastal zone 
management program was described by some experts as the strongest in the country.  It 
was compared favorably to North Carolina and Florida, two progressive and effective 
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schemes.308  The New York Times referred to the BMA, prior to the changes motivated by 
Hugo and Lucas, as “one of the country’s most stringent laws aimed at discouraging 
oceanfront construction.”309  The passage of the BMA was a response to directed research 
and investigation into how the coast could best be protected.  The measures were strong 
but seem to have been a well-intentioned effort by the legislature to do the right thing for 
South Carolina’s beaches.  Because these types of laws were still in the early stages 
everywhere, South Carolina had little to use by way of a model, and it would have been 
difficult for them to predict the opposition that the BMA was to engender. 
 Hurricane Hugo amplified and enhanced opposition to the BMA and directly 
resulted in changes to the law made in the summer of 1990.  As characterized by Cornelia 
Dean of the New York Times, South Carolina “caved in to the pleas of property owners” 
after Hugo; the state changed, and fundamentally weakened, its provisions regarding 
construction in the coastal zone.310  This opposition was lent support by the first trial 
court decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which awarded the plaintiff 
damages as a result of the regulatory taking of his property through the provisions of the 
BMA.  This decision seemed to indicate that the original version of the BMA could result 
in financial consequences for the state and served as an additional argument against these 
provisions by developers and private property owners who hoped to see the regulations 
modified or eliminated. 
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 In addition to preserving the coastal zone for ecological and scenic reasons, there 
are other rationales for strong coastal zone management polices.  First, unwise siting and 
coastal development can have consequences in terms of human lives.  Hurricane Hugo, 
for example, caused twenty-nine deaths in South Carolina alone.311  Second, the cost of 
rebuilding these poorly sited structures usually does not fall on the property owner who 
built there with knowledge of the consequences; in many cases, taxpayers cover these 
costs.  As noted by John Weingart, chief of the Department of Environmental 
Protection’s Division of Coastal Resources, “public resources are invariably called upon 
to rescue private property when the coast is scoured by a serious storm, and taxpayers are 
asked to help pay for new roads, sewers, electric utilities and other services for some of 
the wealthiest….”312  Structures sited unwisely close to the shoreline will inevitably be 
destroyed or broken apart by hurricanes; this debris can, in turn, damage other structures.  
Additionally, private development often has the effect of closing of public, or seemingly 
public, beaches to other potential users. 
As regulatory historian Cary Coglianese has written, “There will always be 
friction between environmentalism and capitalism.  An economy that rests on private 
ownership of land (conferring more privilege than responsibility), on ‘healthy growth’ 
(the magic words), and on profits now (never mind the cost to the grandchildren), is one 
that strains the laws of both nature and ethical society.  When dollars are the goal, uses of 
nature’s bounty too easily become abuses.”313  This friction is evident when considering 
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the history of coastal zone management in South Carolina.  The state’s best efforts at 
creating a strong and effective regulatory program to protect its beaches were defeated by 
citizens who valued their property rights above environmental protection.  In the short 
term, this means that property owners can build houses or commercial buildings like 
hotels closer to the ocean.  In the long term, this likely means that there will be little or no 


























Activities Implicating the Coastal 
Zone 
Federal Flood Control 
Acts 
U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers 
Involved in wetlands permitting; 
provides assistance in beach 
nourishment and navigable waters 
dredging 
Clean Air Act E.P.A. 
(Environmental 
Protection Agency) 
Establishes effluent standards for 
air pollutants 
Clean Water Act E.P.A. Involved in wetlands permitting; 
involved in coastal pollution 
control; establishes effluent 
standards for water pollutants 






Implements National Flood 
Insurance Program; provides pre- 
and post-disaster relief to coastal 




National Park Service Maintains and manages national 
seashores; oversees Coastal Barrier 
Resources System 
Endangered Species Act U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service 
Enforces federal wildlife and 
endangered species laws; maintains 





Manages fisheries; involved in 







                                                 




Lucas Timeline and Holdings  
 
Date Court/Legislation Holding/Outcome 
1986 Original coastal zone legislation in 
force 
Lucas purchases lots which are 
not subject to permit 
requirements 
1988 BMA amended Lucas can not build on lots due 
to new permit requirements  
1989 Charleston County Court of 
Common Pleas 
Lucas awarded damages  
1990 BMA amended Lucas may seek special permit 
to build on lots 
1991 South Carolina Supreme Court Ruling of trial court reversed; 
no taking found; regulation 
deemed in prevention of 
harmful or noxious uses. 
6/29/1992 Supreme Court of the United States South Carolina Supreme Court 
reversed; regulatory taking 
found based on loss of all 
economic value; case remanded 
for determination of common 
law basis of regulation. 
11/20/1992 South Carolina Supreme Court No common law basis for 
restricting Lucas’s use of 
property; remanded to trial 
court for determination of 
temporary takings damages. 
1993 Private Settlement $1,575,000.00 paid to Lucas by 
South Carolina; lots auctioned 
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